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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Totten Trust: The Poor Man's Will
X deposits his money in a savings account in a bank or savings
and loan association in his own name as trustee for Y. The account
reads: "X as trustee for Y." He intends to reserve a power to with-
draw any amount he wishes at any time, and also a power to revoke
the trust altogether. Y may or may not be aware of the deposit. X
retains the passbook. What X is trying to do is to keep complete
power over the deposit during his lifetime, with whatever remains
at his death to go to Y if Y is then alive. This is known as a
"Totten" or tentative trust, the name Totten coming from the style
of one of the early cases to recognize such an arrangement as valid.'
The Totten trust has now been recognized by court decision or
statute in a number of states, including California, Delaware, Dis-
trict of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachu-
setts, Minnesota, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Wash-
ington.2 The Restatement of Trusts also recognizes it.' A mere
handful of modern decisions reject it.4
'Matter of Totten, 179 N.Y. 112, 71 N.E. 748 (1904).2 Brucks v. Home Federal Say. & Loan Ass'n, 36 Cal. 2d 845, 228 P.2d
545 (1951); Delaware Trust Co. v. Fitzmaurice, 27 Del. Ch. 101, 31 A.2d
383 (Ch. 1943); In re Scott's Estate, 96 F. Supp. 290 (D.D.C. 1951);
Seymour v. Seymour, 85 So. 2d 726 (Fla. 1956); Wilder v. Howard, 188
Ga. 426, 4 S.E.2d 199 (1939); Hale v. Hale, 313 Ky. 344, 231 S.W.2d 2(1950); Bollack v. Bollack, 169 Md. 407, 182 At. 317 (1936); Cohen v.
Newton Say. Bank, 320 Mass. 90, 67 N.E.2d 748 (1946); Coughlin v.
Farmers & Mechanics Say. Bank, 199 Minn. 102, 272 N.W. 166 (1937);
Howard Say. Institution v. Kielb, 38 N.J. 186, 183 A.2d 401 (1962); Its re
Pavlinko, 399 Pa. 536, 160 A.2d 554 (1960) ; Leader Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n
v. Hamilton, 46 Tenn. App. 368, 330 S.W.2d 33 (1959); In re Estate of
Madsen, 48 Wash. 2d 675, 296 P.2d 518 (1956).
' RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS § 58 (2d ed. 1959) [Hereinafter cited as RESTAT.
TRUSTS]. "Where a person makes a deposit in a savings account in a
bank or other savings organization in his own name as trustee for an-
other person intending to reserve a power to withdraw the whole or any
part of the deposit at any time during his lifetime and to use as his own
whatever he may withdraw, or otherwise to revoke the trust, the intended
trust is enforceable by the beneficiary upon the death of the depositor as to
any part remaining on deposit on his death if he has not revoked the trust."
Id. at 155.
" Springvale Nat. Bank v. Ward, 122 Me. 227, 119 Atl. 529 (1923);
Bartlett v. Remington, 59 N.H. 364 (1879); Fleck v. Baldwin, 141 Tex.
340, 172 S.W.2d 975 (1943); see Fasano v. Meliso, 146 Conn. 496, 152 A.2d
512 (1959).
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This trust is upheld as a convenient and safe way of disposing
of money, especially small sums. At the death of the depositor
(settlor), evidence is admissible to show that the trust was revocable,
irrevocable, or that it really was not a trust at all (for example, that
the account was placed in this form to deceive the bank or creditors).
If there is no evidence other than the words of the deposit card,
courts generally rule that the inference favors a revocable trust-
Totten.5
Under a Totten trust, the surviving beneficiary takes the remain-
ing deposit subject to certain claims. X's creditors can get at the
account during X's lifetime and even after his death.' The account
is liable for funeral and other estate expenses, at least to the extent
that the estate cannot meet these expenses. 7  There is conflict as
to whether the remaining deposit is included in the decedent's estate
for purposes of ascertaining the widow's statutory share,8 the better
reasoning supporting its inclusion, but with her share to be taken
first out of other assets. The deposit doubtless counts in the de-
cedent's estate for estate and death tax purposes in the same manner
as a revocable trust, due to the amount of control the settlor retains.
It is not necessary that the passbook be delivered to the beneficiary,
and it is not necessary that he even be aware of the trust.' In fact,
delivery of the passbook to the beneficiary may be evidence of an
irrevocable trust or of an inter vivos gift, in which case the incidents
connected with the deposit would be quite different. 10 In the event
of such delivery to Y, evidence would be received to show the
purpose of the act; thus delivery of the passbook to the beneficiary
' Wilder v. Howard, 188 Ga. 426, 4 S.E.2d 199 (1939) ; Matter of Totten,
179 N.Y. 112, 71 N.E. 748 (1904); RESTAT. TRUSTS § 58, comment a (2d
ed. 1959).
'Matter of Halbauer, 34 Misc. 2d 458, 228 N.Y.S.2d 786 (Surr. Ct.
1962); Matter of Palyo, 187 Misc. 884, 62 N.Y.S.2d 394 (1946); Matter
of Weinberg, 162 Misc. 867, 296 N.Y. Supp. 7 (Surr. Ct. 1937); RESTAT.
TRUSTS § 58, comment c (2d ed. 1959). This result is justified on the
basis of the amount of control the depositor keeps.
"Matter of Aybar, 203 Misc. 372, 116 N.Y.S.2d 720 (Surr. Ct. 1952);
Matter of Halbauer, note 6 supra; RESTAT. TRUSTS § 58.
" Cf. RESTAT. TRusTs § 58, comment e (2d ed. 1959) ; Matter of Halpern,
303 N.Y. 33, 100 N.E.2d 120 (1951). The argument for including the
account is that the depositor's control is so great that the account was for
this purpose, his property.9 Annots., 157 A.L.R. 925 (1945); 168 A.L.R. 1324 (1947).
"0 If the deposit were held to be a gift the depositor's creditors, wife, etc.,
would not be able to get at the deposit; further, the depositor would be liable
for any withdrawals he made.
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will not of itself prevent the deposit from being considered a Totten
trust.
Even though there are no withdrawals by the depositor, he may
revoke by words or acts that indicate a revocation;" for example,
the depositor's pledging of the passbook on a loan may amount to
revocation.' 2  He may also revoke by will if it is clear that this
was the intent; but if there is no mention of the deposit, a general
residuary clause by itself will not act as a revocation. 8 Where the
depositor becomes insane, his guardian can revoke only if necessary
for the welfare of the depositor.'4
The Totten trust thus bears a close resemblance to an inter
vivos trust in which the settlor is trustee and in which he reserves
full right to amend and revoke; the unusual feature in the Totten
arrangement is the amount of control the depositor retains. When
the settlor of the Totten trust withdraws money for his own use, he
is in effect revoking the trust as to that amount (pro tanto). Credi-
tors have even greater rights under the Totten trust, for normally
creditors of the settlor cannot get at a trust merely because it is
revocable or amendable. 5
The fundamental objection to the Totten trust is the charge
that it violates the statute of wills, that it is testamentary. This
charge is based on the amount of control which the depositor
retains.' An ordinary inter vivos trust certainly would be in danger
'
1 Brucks v. Home Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 36 Cal.2d 845, 228 P.2d
545 (1951) (unmailed letter revoked); In re Onody's Will, 33 Misc. 2d
497, 226 N.Y.S.2d 645 (Surr. Ct. 1962); Matter of Stelma, 25 Misc. 2d 234,
201 N.Y.S.2d 609 (Surr. Ct. 1960). Cf. In re Ryan's Will, 52 N.Y.S.2d
502 (Surr. Ct. 1944) (unmailed letter not revoked). See Annot., 38
A.L.R.2d 1234 (1954).
" Evinger v. MacDougall, 28 Cal. App. 2d 175, 82 P.2d 194 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1938).
" Brucks v. Home Federal Say. & Loan Ass'n, 36 Cal. 2d 845, 228 P.2d
545 (1951); Matter of Ludwig, 207 Misc. 860, 140 N.Y.S.2d 742 (Surr.
Ct. 1955); In re Ryan's Will, 52 N.Y.S.2d 502 (Surr. Ct. 1944). See also
Matter of Ginsburg, 27 Misc. 2d 586, 213 N.Y.S.2d 228 (Surr. Ct. 1961)
(passbook in safe-deposit box and will leaves contents of safe-deposit box to
d third person); Matter of Athanasiou, 24 Misc. 2d 12, 202 N.Y.S.2d 675
(Surr. Ct. 1960).1 
" Simmons v. First Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 132 F. Supp. 370 (D.D.C.
1955) ; Guardianship of Cuen, 142 Cal. App. 2d 258, 298 P.2d 545 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1956); REsTAT. TRusTs § 58, comment c (2d ed. 1959).
" Jones v. Clifton, 101 U.S. 225 (1879). See Scott, The Effects of a
Power to Revoke a Trust, 57 HARv. L. Rv. 362 (1944); Annot., 92 A.L.R.
282 (1934).
"6 The argument that such a trust is testamentary due to the amount of
control retained by the settlor may be put another way. Due to the control
[Vol. 42
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if so much control were retained by the settlor, although courts are
now more liberal in this respect than formerly.1 But due to the
nature of a savings account, and due to the societal need for and
safety of such a simple device for disposing of small sums of money,
courts such as those of New York have recognized the Totten
arrangement. They simply say that this is a safe and useful method
and that it should be upheld. In the Totten decision in 1904 the
court wrote:
A brief review of the cases will show how the subject has been
gradually developed so as to accord with the methods of the
multitude of persons who make deposits in these banks ....
It is necessary for us to settle the conflict by laying down such
a rule as will best promote the interests of all the people in the
state.'
8
Professor Scott writes:
In view . . . of the convenience of this method of disposing of
comparatively small sums of money without the necessity of
resorting to probate proceedings, there seems to be no sufficiently
strong policy to invalidate these trusts. Not only is the amount
involved usually comparatively small, but it is easy to identify,
and there is no great danger of fraudulent claims resulting from
the absence of an attested instrument.' 9
The validity of the Totten arrangement requires a finding of a
present interest in the beneficiary. To be sure, some courts use
language which indicates that the beneficiary receives no interest
until the death of the settlor, but this is unsound for it does marked
violence to the statute of wills; further, in such case a later will
would ordinarily revoke the trust. The correct view is that the
beneficiary now receives an interest, with enjoyment both postponed
and tentative.2 0 In this light, the argument that the trust is testa-
mentary falls.
retained, no interest in the property passes to the intended beneficiary until
the death of the settlor; thus the trust is testamentary and must meet the
statute of wills. It is fundamental that to have an inter vivos trust, a present
interest must now pass to the beneficiary-although enjoyment may be post-
poned.
"' See, e.g., National Shawmut Bank v. Joy, 315 Mass. 457, 53 N.E.2d
113 (1944); Ridge v. Bright, 244 N.C. 345, 93 S.E.2d 607 (1956). (Settlor
retained life interest; right to amend, revoke, and change the beneficiary; he
was also trustee. Upheld as valid instrument.)
18 Matter of Totten, 179 N.Y. 112, 120, 125, 71 N.E. 748, 750, 752 (1904).
19 1 Scorr, TRUSTS § 58.3 at 484-85 (1956).
20 See Fasano v. Meliso, 146 Conn. 496, 152 A.2d 512 (1959). This de-
19631
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It should be noted that the Totten arrangement is a trust, not a
gift;21 also, that it is not the same thing as a joint bank account
with right of survivorship. The latter, by contract, may be used
in North Carolina to leave money to the survivor ;22 but, except in
a husband-wife situation which is covered by a recent statute,2 3
such accounts are fraught with risk.24 It may also be noted that a
number of states, including North Carolina, 5 provide by statute that
when a deposit is made in a savings bank by one person in trust
for a second person, and no further notice is given to the bank
as to purpose or intent, the bank may pay the remaining deposit to
the beneficiary on the prior death of the trustee. These statutes
often have been enacted merely for the protection of the bank, and
a number of courts have held that the statute does not validate the
payment as between the beneficiary and the representative of the
decedent's estate.26 I would think that the North Carolina statute
is merely to protect the bank."
I find no evidence that North Carolina has even considered the
Totten arrangement as such. One case,2s and no doubt others, con-
tained a situation where the principles might have been applied
but they were not mentioned. The courts themselves have taken the
lead in New York and other states in accepting the Totten trust.
If the matter is properly presented, I see no reason why the North
Carolina courts should refuse to endorse this salutary device. Fur-
cision, in dictum, incorrectly applies the Totten principles, for this was
clearly a Totten trust, but the dictum does illustrate the principle that an
interest must pass now.
2" See Fasano v. Meliso, 146 Conn. 496, 152 A.2d 512 (1959) (delivery
of passbook to beneficiary).
2 Bowling v. Bowling, 243 N.C. 515, 91 S.E.2d 176 (1956).8 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-2.1 (Supp. 1961)
24 The North Carolina decisions on joint bank accounts with right of sur-
vivorship are in confusion. A lawyer takes his reputation in his hands when
he advises one without the most careful draftsmanship. Smith v. Smith,
255 N.C. 152, 120 S.E.2d 575 (1961); Buffaloe v. Barnes, 226 N.C. 778,
39 S.E.2d 599 (1946). Cf. Wilson County v. Wooten, 251 N.C. 667, 111
S.E.2d 875 (1960).
" N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 53-59 (1960).
" O'Hara v. O'Hara, 291 Mass. 75, 195 N.E. 909 (1935).
279 N.C.L. REv. 13 (1930).
8 1n Wescott v. First & Citizens Nat. Bank, 227 N.C. 39, 40 S.E.2d 461
(1946) a soldier overseas mailed money to a bank in the state to be placed
on savings, and if he died, the money was to go to his grandfather. The
soldier wrote the bank that the money was to be a "trust." His language is
not quite apt for the typical Totten deposit but the court might well have
decided the case on that theory and thereby carried out the wishes and plans
for a soldier killed in a foreign land.
[Vol. 42
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ther, I see no reason why our courts would not follow the broad
approach of the Restatement of Trusts and of the New York courts.
There is no basis for a contentious approach.
Assuming that the North Carolina courts accept the Totten
trust, the lawyer is faced with the problem of draftsmanship for
the deposit. A simple deposit reading "John Doe in trust for
Richard Roe" should prima facie establish a Totten trust, subject
to the rules of evidence and proof regarding a contrary intent
mentioned earlier. To add a variety of provisions on the card re-
garding right to control, etc., may result in the trust being held
tb be testamentary. On the other hand it is desirable, I believe,
that direct evidence of the Totten intent appear on the deposit card
as this may avoid a lawsuit after death. I would add the following
in readable size type:
It is the intent of the depositor, John Doe, to establish a "Totten"
trust. The depositor is to have full power to withdraw all or
part of the funds deposited at any time, and to revoke at any
time. On the death of the depositor, if the beneficiary be then
living, the bank is authorized to pay the balance in the the account
to such beneficiary, such beneficiary to then own the account
fully and absolutely.
In my opinion the Totten trust is the sort of development that
can best be worked out by the courts rather than by a state statute.
The courts can mold and shape and give life and adapt. However,
there is enough court history in other states for guidance, and so
it may be that a statute would be the safe way out for this state.
If there is to be a statute, I would suggest that the exact words of
section fifty-eight of the Restatement of Trusts be used.29
THOiMAS W. CHRISTOPHER*
Criminal Law-Confessions-Admissibility of Corroborative Evidence
I It is the general rule in the United States that a felony conviction
may not be based upon a naked extrajudicial confession of guilt, un-
corroborated by any other evidence.1 Most decisions concerning
" General references on Totten Trust: 1 ScoTT, TRUSTS § 58-58.5; 1
BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 47 (1951); Annots., 157 A.L.R. 925
(1945); 168 A.L.R. 1324 (1947).
* Professor of Law, University of North Carolina.
'See, e.g., Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84'(1954); Pate v. State,
36 Ala. App. 688, 63 So. 2d 223 (1953); State v. Skinner, 132 Conn. 163,
43 A.2d 76 (1945). See generally Note, Proof of the Corpus Delicti Aliunde
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such corroborative evidence deal with the problem of the quantum
of evidence required to satisfy the rule. Another problem which
sometimes arises in this area involves the nature or quality of
evidence which may be used as corroboration of such confessions.
In the recent case of Wong Sun v. United States2 the United States
Supreme Court dealt with the question of the quality of evidence
used for corroboration in a case of first impression. The Court
held that the extrajudicial confession of one defendant could not be
used to corroborate a similar confession of a co-defendant.' The
Court held that the import of its previous decisions was that the
hearsay statements of an alleged co-conspirator were never ad-
missible against the accused, unless made during and in furtherance
the Defendant's Confession, 103 U. PA. L. Rrv. 638 (1955) and Annot., 45
A.L.R.2d 1316 (1956).371 U.S. 471 (1963).
The facts of the case were somewhat unusual. Federal narcotics agents,
acting on the tip of an informer of unknown reliability, went to the home of
petitioner Toy and, without benefit of a search or arrest warrant, broke in
and arrested him when he attempted to flee. Toy then admitted he had smoked
heroin with one Yee. At Yee's residence the agents found contraband
narcotics. Yee implicated Toy and petitioner Wong Sun, who each gave
the agents unsigned confessions implicating the other. The voluntary char-
acter of the confessions was not disputed. See Wong Sun v. United States,
288 F.2d 366 (9th Cir. 1961). Petitioners were tried by a federal judge and
convicted of violating the narcotics laws. The government's evidence con-
sisted solely of four items which were admitted over the objection that they
were fruits of unlawful arrests or searches: (1) the incriminating statement
by Toy when arrested; (2) the heroin found at Yee's residence; (3) Toy's
confession; (4) Wong Sun's confession. The Court of Appeals held that
the arrests were illegal but that these items were not "fruits" and were ad-
missible to corroborate the confessions; it affirmed the convictions. Wong
Sun v. United States, 288 F.2d 366 (9th Cir. 1961).
The Supreme Court held that the evidence other than Wong Sun's con-
fession was inadmissible against Toy as "fruits" of the illegality. The Court
held that the fourth amendment protected defendant against the overhearing
of verbal statements as well as against the more usual seizure of papers and
effects. 371 U.S. at 484-85. Stating that the settled principle of federal
criminal law was that a conviction must rest upon firmer ground than the
uncorroborated confession of the accused, the Court held that Wong Sun's
confession was inadmissible against Toy for any purpose; therefore, Toy's
conviction must be set aside for lack of evidence to corroborate his con-
fession. As to Wong Sun, the Court held that his confession was cor-
roborated by the seized heroin, since he had no standing to suppress it.
However, since the trial court had overruled his objection to the admission
of Toy's confession, the Court held that this confession may have been
erroneously considered admissible against Wong Sun. As a result, Wong
Sun was also given a new trial on the ground that in narcotics cases, where
evidence of possession alone is sufficient to convict, the required corrobora-
tion should be found among evidence properly admitted against the accused.
[Vol. 42
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of the conspiracy.4 Under this view, of course, a confession by one
defendant could never be used to corroborate the confession of a co-
defendant, since it would never be made during and in furtherance
of a conspiracy. The Court thus adopted a rather rigid exclusionary
rule in regard to the quality of such evidence, despite the fact that,
as to the quantum of evidence, it had taken a more permissive view.
In Smith v. United States5 the Court held that it was sufficient "if
the corroboration merely fortifies the truth of the confession, with-
out independently establishing the crime charged."6  The apparently
conflicting philosophies underlying these two rulings suggest that
the entire area may be in need of re-examination by the courts.
The rationale underlying the requirement that extrajudicial
confessions be corroborated seems to be based upon two factors,
which the courts often fail to distinguish.7 First, there is the
possibility that the confession, though voluntarily given, is false.
The accused might have been lying to establish an alibi, to obtain
leniency in the face of apparently overwhelming evidence of guilt,
or because of some delusion of guilt or psychological compulsion
to confess falsely.' Secondly, there is the possibility that a false
'The Court had previously held, in accordance with the general rule,
that a confession admitted against the confessor is incompetent as evidence
of the guilt of a co-defendant on a joint trial, and that the jury must be so
instructed. See, e.g., Delli Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S. 232 (1957);
Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440 (1949).
-348 U.S. 147 (1954).
OId. at 156.
TThe Supreme Court has stated that the foundation of the rule "lies in
a long history of judicial experience with confessions and in the realization
that sound law enforcement requires police investigations which extend be-
yond the words of the accused. Confessions may be unreliable because they
are coerced or induced, and although separate doctrines exclude involuntary
confessions from consideration by the jury... further caution is warranted
because the accused may be unable to establish the involuntary nature of his
statements. Moreover, though a statement may not be 'involuntary' within
the meaning of this exclusionary rule, still its reliability may be suspect
if it is extracted from one who is under the pressure of a police investiga-
tion .... Finally, the experience of the courts, the police, and the medical
profession recounts a number of false confessions voluntarily made .... .
Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147, 153 (1954).
In Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84, 89-90 (1954), the Court pointed
out that "in our country the doubt persists that the zeal of the agencies of
prosecution to protect the peace, the self-interest of the accomplice, the
pnaliciousness of an enemy or the aberration or weakness of the accused
under the strain of suspicion may tinge or warp the facts of the con-
fession."
'Looking at confessions from this point of view, some courts have
concluded that they are inherently untrustworthy. Thus in State v. Long, 2
1963]
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confession might have been secured by means of physical or psycho-
logical duress, or even manufactured by the police. Dean Wigmore,
in attacking the corroboration requirement as an "exhibition of senti-
mentalism toward the guilty,"9 reasoned that a confession is properly
viewed in two aspects; that is, the confession as evidence should be
considered apart from the evidence establishing the existence and
content of the confession and its voluntary nature. He noted that
the conflict of opinion as to the value of confessions could largely
be explained by the fact that these ideas were confused. Wigmore
believed the voluntary confession to be evidence of the highest order
and discounted the danger of voluntary false confessions. He
pointed out that it was the evidence of the genuineness and volun-
tary nature of the confession which was properly open to suspicion,
and argued that the proper safeguard lay in exacting more testimony
as to the manner in which the confession was elicited.Y Instead of
a rigid rule requiring a set standard of corroboration which might
be capable of abuse by the guilty, Wigmore suggested that the better
procedure would be to receive all well-proved confessions in evi-
dence and to leave them to the jury, subject to all discrediting cir-
cumstances, to receive such weight as may seem proper. 1 If con-
sidered necessary the jury could be warned by court or counsel of the
possible dangers in such evidence.'"
Few American courts have been willing to accept the Wigmore
thesis. Judge Learned Hand, while reluctantly bowing to the fact
that the weight of authority required corroboration, questioned the
N.C. 455, 456 (1797), it was said that "a confession, from the very nature
of the thing, is a very doubtful species of evidence, and to be received with
great caution. It is hardly to be supposed that a man perfectly possessed
of himself would make a confession to take away his own life." A modern
case representative of this viewpoint is State v. Johnson, 95 Utah 572, 83
P.2d 1010 (1938). On the other hand, some courts have stated that a con-
fession is the highest kind of evidence. At one time this was the view of the
Supreme Court. See Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574 (1884). Numerous cases
to like effect are collected in 3 WIGmoRn, EVIDENCE § 866 n.3 (3d ed. 1940)
[hereinafter cited as WIGMORn].
93 WGmoRE § 867.
103 WIGMORE § 866. A similar position was taken by Ruffin, C. J., in
State v. Cowan, 29 N.C. 239, 246 (1847): "Now few things happen seldomer
than that one in the possession of his understanding should of his own accord
make a confession against himself which is not true. Innocence or weak-
ness is therefore sufficiently guarded by the rule which excludes a confession
unduly obtained by hope or fear." Contrast this view with that taken in State
v. Long, 2 N.C. 455 (1797).
1 3 WIGMORE § 867.
" 7 WIGMORE § 2070.
[Vol. 42
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wisdom of the rule. "That the rule has in fact any substantial
necessity in justice, we are much disposed to doubt .... [I]t seems
to us that such evils as it corrects could be much more flexibly
treated by the judge at trial .... ,113 Despite such critics, the
corroboration rule appears to be inextricably imbedded in the Ameri-
can criminal law. Only a handful of American jurisdictions allow
a felony conviction to be based upon an uncorroborated extra-
judicial confession.14
While most courts are in agreement that some corroboration
is needed, they are divided on the question of how much extrinsic
evidence is required and to what issues in the case it must relate.
According to the overwhelming weight of authority, the evidence
must relate to and tend to establish the corpus delicti.15 The corpus
delicti under this rule includes only two of the elements of proof
needed to convict, that is, proof that some injury was done and
that it was done by a criminal agency; the third element, criminal
participation by the accused, may be proven by the confession
itself."0 A few American courts have rejected this rigid "corpus
delicti" formula and require only that some facts be proven outside
the confession which provide reasonable corroboration under the
circumstances.' 7 The English view seems even more flexible.
Generally the English courts require no corroboration of extra-
judicial confessions; however, in cases involving homicide, larceny,
3 Daeche v. United States, 250 Fed. 566, 571 (2d Cir. 1918). Professor
McCormick has taken a similar position opposing the inflexibility of the rule.
See McCoRMICK, EVIDENCE § 110 (1954).
1' See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Kimball, 321 Mass. 290, 73 N.E.2d 468
(1947); Potman v. State, 259 Wis. 234, 47 N.W.2d 884 (1951). A few
states construe local statutes requiring corroboration as being inapplicable
to misdemeanors, and allow convictions of such offenses to be based upon
uncorroborated confessions. See, e.g., People v. Erickson, 171 Misc. 937, 13
N.Y.S.2d 997 (Magis. Ct. New York City 1939). North Carolina has
applied the corroboration rule to reverse a conviction in a misdemeanor case;
the court did not consider whether such cases should be distinguished from
felony cases. State v. Bass, 253 N.C. 318, 116 S.E.2d 772 (1960).
1 See, e.g., United States v. Markman, 193 F.2d 574 (2d Cir. 1952);
State v. Romo, 66 Ariz. 174, 185 P.2d 757 (1947); State v. Morgan, 157
La. 962, 103 So. 278 (1925). Some states have adopted the rule by statute.
See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 634.03 (1947). See generally Annot., 45
A.L.R.2d 1316 (1956).
1 See, e.g., State v. Benham, 58 Ariz. 129, 118 P.2d 91 (1941) ; Holland
v. State, 39 Fla. 178, 22 So. 298 (1897); State v. Morgan, 157 La. 962, '103
So. 278 (1925). But see Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147 (1954)
(corroborative evidence must implicate accused if no tangible corpus delicti).
17 See, e.g., Logue v. State, 198 Ga. 672, 32 S.E.2d 397 (1944); State
v. Cardwell, 90 Kan. 606, 135 Pac. 597 (1913).
1963]
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or bigamy, the trial court may either require independent corrobora-
tive evidence or warn the jury not to accept the truth of the con-
fession too readily.'8
In North Carolina the rule requiring corroboration of extra-
judicial confessions has undergone radical transformations. In the
early case of State v. Long 9 North Carolina seemed to be un-
questionably in accord with the general American rule requiring
corroboration. Yet in State v. Cowan20 Chief Justice Ruffin
equated a "fully proved" and voluntary extrajudicial confession
with a confession made in open court, and stated unequivocally that
such a confession "which goes to the whole case is plenary evidence
to the jury";" that is, an uncorroborated confession may itself
establish all the elements of the corpus delicti and thus support a
conviction. In 1954, in State v. Cope,22 the court reaffirmed the
earlier Long holding and again joined the majority in requiring
corroboration. However, in a dictum the court attempted to lay
down a rule to determine the quantum of corroborative evidence
required: "[I]t is our considered judgment that in such cases there
must be evidence aliunde the confession of sufficient probative
value to establish the fact that a crime of the character charged has
been committed."2  After this decision North Carolina was con-
sidered to be among those jurisdictions having a rather stringent
requirement as to the quantum of the extrinsic evidence.24 In the
recenil, case of State v. Whittemore,25 however, the court again
shifted its ground. State v. Cope 6 was construed as holding only
that a naked extrajudicial confession will not support a conviction
and the dictum quoted above was disapproved. Whittemore seems
to stand for the proposition that it is not required to have full, direct,
8 See generally MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 110 n.2 (1954) and 7 WIGMORE
§ 2070 and cases therein cited.12 N.C. 455 (1797):
2029 N.C. 239 (1847). The court did not mention State v. Long, supra
note 19, but instead relied upon English authorities.21 Id. at 246. This led some writers to conclude that North Carolina,
like Massachusetts, required no corroboration of extrajudicial confessions.
See, e.g., STANSBURY, NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE § 182 (1946); 23 N.C.L.
REV. 364 (1945).22240 N.C. 244, 81 S.E.2d 773 (1954).
23 Id. at 247, 81 S.E.2d at 776 (1954).
2 See Note, Proof of the Corpus Delicti Aliunde the Defendant's Con-
fession, 103 U. PA. L. REv. 638 (1955).
22255 N.C. 583, 122 S.E.2d 396 (1961).
' 240 N.C. 244, 81 S.E.2d 773 (1954).
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and positive evidence of the corpus delicti independent of the con-
fession, so long as there are "such extrinsic corroborative circum-
stances, as will, when taken in connection with the confession,
establish the prisoner's guilt in the minds of the jury beyond a
reasonable doubt. ' 7  This view of the sufficiency of the extrinsic
evidence seems to be in accord with the more permissive and
flexible minority view."8
Although it seems well established as a general rule in American
courts that extrajudicial confessions must have corroboration of
some sort, the question of the quality or competency of this evidence
has seldom been raised.2" The few cases which have dealt with the
problem of whether otherwise incompetent evidence is admissible for
the limited purpose of corroborating a confession are generally in
accord with the principal case in refusing to admit such evidence
for this purpose.8" North Carolina has taken a similar position.
In State v. Cope31 the court held that even though the pre-trial
statement of the state's witness was admissible to impeach her in-
consistent testimony, it was not admissible to corroborate the de-
fendant's extrajudicial confession. Since there was no other cor-
roborative evidence, the defendant's conviction was reversed.32 This
decision is an extension of the rule laid down in prior decisions that
27 255 N.C. at 589, 122 S.E.2d at 401.
28 See cases cited note 17 supra.
20 See generally 7 WIGMORE § 2071. Corroborative evidence may be
either direct or circumstantial. Allen v. State, 230 Miss. 740, 93 So. 2d 844
(1957). Testimony by the defendant or by an accomplice may suffice. See,
e.g., People v. Manske, 399 II. 176, 77 N.E.2d 164 (1948) (defendant's
testimony); Parsons v. State, 191 Ind. 194, 131 N.E. 381 (1921) (accom-
plice's testimony).
'0 See, e.g., Cohron v. State, 156 Tex. Crim. 331, 242 S.W.2d 776 (1951);
Pepoon v. Commonwealth. 192 Va. 804, 66 S.E.2d 854 (1951). In State v.
Johnson, 31 N.J. 489, 158 A.2d 11 (1960), the court said by way of dictum
that "It is . . . clear that admissions and confessions made by each de-
fendant may not be used to corroborate the admissions and confessions of
the others." 31 N.J. at 504, 158 A.2d at 19. But cf. State v. Knight, 19
Iowa 94 (1865) wherein the court stated that hearsay testimony as to state-
ments made after the offense by a confederate was admissible for the limited
purpose of corroborating defendant's extrajudicial confession; however, in
this case there was other corroborative evidence which was clearly ad-
missible and the court suggests that even if the admission of the hearsay
evidence was error, it was not prejudicial error. See generally Note, Proof
of the Corpus Delicti Aliunde the Defendant's Confession., 103 U. PA. L.
REv. 638 (1955).
2240 N.C. 244, 81 S.E.2d 773 (1954).
02 In a similar Tennessee case, the court reversed defendant's conviction
on the same ground, despite the fact that the court was entirely convinced of
his guilt. King v. State, 187 Tenn. 431, 215 S.W.2d 813 (1948).
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ordinarily inadmissible evidence admitted to corroborate or impeach
a witness may not be considered as substantive evidence against
the accused.33.
The problem of the admissibi lity of such corroborative evidence
had primarily arisen in regard to evidence barred by tle rule against
hearsay. For example, in the Wong Sun3 case, each defendant's
extrajudicial statement was barred by the hearsay rule as sub-
stantive proof of the guilt of his co-defendant, although competent
against himself under the "admissions" exception to the rule.30 It
could perhaps be plausibly argued that, since hearsay evidence is not
without probative value,36 the Court should have relaxed the strict
rules of evidence and allowed the two confessions to be mutually cor-
roborative.3 7  However, as the Court indicated, the circumstances
" See, e.g., State v. Neville, 51 N.C. 424 (1859) (prior inconsistent
statement admissible only to impeach witness); State v. Rogers, 233 N.C.
390, 64 S.E.2d 572 (1951) (prior consistent statements admissible only to
corroborate witness). Such corroborative extrajudicial statements can only
corroborate the witness who made them. State v. Lassiter, 191 N.C. 210,
131 S.E. 577 (1926). It might be thought that to admit such evidence to
impeach or corroborate a witness is necessarily to admit it against the
accused despite limiting instructions, since without this evidence the jury
might not believe the witness. See dissent by Judge Stacy in State v.
Davis, 229 N.C. 386, 50 S.E.2d 37 (1948). However, such evidence is
more trustworthy than ordinary hearsay, since here the person who made
the statement is subject to cross-examination. See Beaty v. United States,
203 F.2d 652 (4th Cir. 1953).
"Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
It might be argued that each defendant's confession should be com-
petent against the other under the "declaration against interest" exception
to the hearsay rule. However, this exception makes admissible only those
extrajudicial declarations of an unavailable declarant as to facts against his
pecuniary or proprietary interest. Thus a confession would not qualify since
the declarant usually is technically available, and the declaration is against
penal, riot pecuniary or proprietary interest. This view has been criticized
as unnecessarily restrictive. See MCCORMICI, EVIDENCE §255 (1954).
Under the almost universal rule, even a confession by another person that
he and not defendant committed the crime is barred by the hearsay rule.
Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243 (1913). In an eloquent dissent in
this case, Mr. justice Holmes argued that such confessions should be ad-
mitted as declarations against interest. 228 U.S. at 277-78. North Caro-
lina is in accord with the general rule that such evidence is inadmissible.
State v. English, 201 N.C. 295, 159 S.E. 318 (1931).
"The weight of authority seems to support the view that if hearsay is
admitted without objection, it is as strong as legally competent evidence.
See, e.g., Weil v. Free State Oil Co., 200 Md. 62, 87 A.2d 826 (1952);
White v. Newman, 10 Utah 2d 62, 348 P.2d 343 (1960). Such evidence
may be used to corroborate admissions of the accused. Smith v. State, 72
Fla. 263, 73 So. 188 (1916).
"' See Note, Proof of the Corps Delicti Aliunde the Defendant's Con-
fession, 103 U: PA. L. R!v. 638 (1955).
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of this case give rise to certain policy considerations which militate
against such a relaxation. What one participant says about his
partner in crime may be based on spite, fear, pique, desire to stand
well with the prosecution, or many other things not leading to
truth.3 8  Nevertheless, the Court goes further than the particular
circumstances of the case seem to warrant when it supports its
decision with the unexamined assumption that, since the hearsay rule
goes to the admissibility of the evidence, evidence barred by the
hearsay rule as substantive proof is ipso facto barred for corrobora-
tive purposes as well.39 The Court fails to consider the possibility
that it might be desirable to have different standards of admissi-
bility for ordinary substantive evidence and evidence merely cor-
roborative of a full confession of guilt.
Some of the principal difficulties in this area arise in cases in-
volving joint trials. The problem consists primarily of the neces-
sity of allowing evidence into the trial as to one defendant which
may be prejudicial to the interests of a co-defendant. Where there
is such a joint trial, the North Carolina court has followed the
majority, holding confessions of one defendant admissible where the
trial judge instructed the jury that such evidence could be used only
against the confessor." As the United States Supreme Court has
" Levie, Hearsay and Conspiracy, 52 MIcH. L. REv. 1159, 1173 (1954).
Cf. WILLIAM S, PROOF OF GuILT 135 (2d ed. 1958): "The accomplice may
no longer have anything to fear or hope from the way in which he gives his
evidence; yet he may mistakenly entertain such a fear or hope, or he may
wish by his evidence against others to gratify some spite against them."
"371 U.S. at 491. A similar unexamined assumption is made by the
North Carolina court in State v. Cope,'240 N.C. 244, 81 S.E.2d 773 (1954),
discussed in text accompanying note 32 supra.
,0 The trial judge must instruct the jury that "the confession so offered
is admitted as evidence against the defendant who made it but is not evidence
and is not to be considered by the jury in any way in determining the
charges against his co-defendant(s)." Bobbitt, J., in State v. Kerley, 246
N.C. 157, 161, 97 S.E.2d 876, 879 (1957). (Emphasis added.)
North Carolina does allow the confession of a co-participant in the
crime to be used indirectly against another, where the other "adopts" such
a confession made in his presence; the rationale being that by adoption the
accused makes the confession his own. See, e.g., State v. vlurray, 216 N.C.
681, 6 S.E.2d 513 (1940). A few courts have held that a confession thus
made in the defendant's presence and not denied by him may be admitted
together with his adoptive conduct to corroborate his own confession. See,
e.g., Sutton v. Commonwealth, 207 Ky. 597, 269 S.W. 754 (1925). Contra,
State v. Ferry, 2 Utah 2d 371, 275 P.2d 173 (1954). See also, United States
v. Calderon, 348 U.S. 160 (1954). It has been held that a corroborated
admission by the accused may suffice to corroborate his confession. Smith
v. United States, 348 U.S. 147 (1954).
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pointed out, it is highly doubtful that a jury can perform such
mental legerdemain with any degree of success ;41 therefore, the only
truly satisfactory solution lies in granting a severance to the de-
fendant who would be unduly prejudiced. However, it has long
been held that this is a matter within the sound discretion of the
trial judge." Due to the crowded condition of most courts the
refusal of a motion for severance is seldom held an abuse of this
discretion.
As recognized by the United States Supreme Court in Smith
v. United States,4" the rule requiring extrinsic corroboration even
of admittedly voluntary confessions infringes on the province of the
trier of fact; consequently, "its application should be scrutinized
lest the restrictions it imposes surpass the dangers which gave rise
to them."44  It has been suggested that if the appellate court were
given the power of review on the facts and justice of the result
even if there be evidence to support the lower court decision, it
would lessen the urge to resort to such mechanical and inflexible
rules for reversing an unjust result. 5 It has also been suggested
that it would be more in accordance with the public interest to rule
that, where corroboration of the evidence for the prosecution would
otherwise be required, it shall be dispensed with if the accused does
not give evidence in his own defense.46 In regard to the admissi-
bility of the evidence required by the corroboration rule, the principal
case illustrates the difficulty often encountered in reconciling a strict
rule of evidence with the public interest that criminals should be
convicted. It seems clear that insofar as the corroboration rule
is concerned, the American courts have failed to achieve such a
reconciliation.
GEORGE M. BEASLEY, III
1The whole doctrine is severely criticized yet grudgingly followed in
Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440 (1949).
"The difficulty in securing a severance in situations like that in the
principal case is shown by the recent case of State v. Johnson, 31 N.J. 489,
158 A.2d 11 (1960), which held that the trial court did not abuse his dis-
cretion in refusing to grant severance since (1) the confessions were not in
dispute as to the essential facts of the crime; (2) separate trials would
create difficult problems of administration; (3) the trial judge gave ample
instructions to the jury limiting the confessions to the respective confessor.
" 348 U.S. 147 (1954).
"lId. at 153.
See generally MCCORMicK, EVIDENCE § 75 (1954).
"See WILLIAMS, PROOF OF GUILT 140 (2d ed. 1958).
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Deeds-Married Women-Husband's Joinder
In the recent case of Cruthis v. Steele' a wife attemped to convey
to the children of her first marriage, a tract of land which she had
held as tenant by the entirety with her deceased first husband. She
was not joined in the deed by her second husband. The instrument,
dated in 1916 and duly recorded, was under seal and purported to
convey the tract for one dollar, love and affection, subject to the
grantor's life estate. The second husband predeceased her in 1949.
The grantor died intestate survived by children of both marriages.
The children of the second marriage brought a special proceeding
for the sale of the land for partition. The defendants, the daughter
of the first marriage and the heirs at law of the deceased son of
the first marriage, contended that the plaintiffs were in privity with
the grantor and were bound by her deed through estoppel or other-
wise. The court held that since the wife was not joined by her
husband in the deed, the deed was void, and since there was no
consideration for this deed it could not be enforced as a valid con-
tract to convey.
In North Carolina any conveyance by a married woman of her
real property without the written assent of her husband is void.'
Since in this state the common law disabilities of a married woman
to contract, with certain exceptions, have been removed,3 she is
bound by an estoppel the same as any other person,4 but a deed which
is invalid for failure to comply with some constitutional or statutory
1259 N.C. 701, 131 S.E.2d 344 (1963).
Cruthis v. Steele, 259 N.C. 701, 131 S.E.2d 344 (1963); Buford v.
Mochy, 224 N.C. 235, 29 S.E.2d 729 (1944). N.C. CONST. art. X, § 6 pro-
vides: "The real and personal property of any female in this State acquired
before marriage, and all property, real and personal, to which she may, after
marriage, become in any manner entitled, shall be and remain the sole and
separate estate and property of such female, and shall not be liable for any
debts, obligations, or engagements of her husband, and may be devised and
bequeathed, and, with the written assent of her husband, conveyed by her as
if she were unmarried." The language of the implementing statute, N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 52-1 (1950), is identical. Vann v. Edwards, 135 N.C. 661, 47
S.E. 784 (1904) held that the requirement that she have the written assent
of her husband applied only to real property. The court in Perry v. Stancil,
237 N.C. 442, 75 S.E.2d 512 (1953), construed N.C. CONsT. art. X, § 6 to
require the consent of the husband only when a conveyance is executed by
a married woman to a person other than her husband. N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 39-13.3(d) (Supp. 1961) provides that the wife may convey directly to her
husband without his joinder in the deed, subject to the provisions of N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 52-12 (1950).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-2 (1950).
'Tripp v. Langston, 218 N.C. 295, 10 S.E.2d 916 (1940).
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provision is null and void in contemplation of law and does not
operate as an estoppel during coverture5
North Carolina has held in a number of cases6 that a married
woman who conveys her realty without the written assent of her
husband may not after his death recover the land or defeat the title
of her grantee, or those in privity with him, on the ground that the
deed was void for lack of assent of her husband at the time of the
execution. The court has held in these cases that the invalid deed
will be construed as a contract to convey, and specific performance
accordingly required. In each case where the court found that
there was a contract to convey, the original deed was supported by
a valuable consideration.8 It would appear then from the decision
in Cruthis that had the purported conveyance of the wife been sup-
ported by a valuable consideration, the court would have required
specific performance.'
'Buford v. Mochy, 224 N.C. 235, 29 S.E.2d 729 (1944); Greensboro
Morris Plan Co. v. Palmer, 185 N.C. 109, 116 S.E. 261 (1923); Wallin v.
Rice, 170 N.C. 417, 87 S.E. 239 (1915); Smith v. Ingram, 130 N.C. 100, 40
S.E. 984 (1902).
'Everett v. Ballard, 174 N.C. 16, 93 S.E. 385 (1917); Robinson v.
Daughtry, 171 N.C. 200, 88 S.E. 252 (1916) ; Warren v. Dail, 170 N.C. 406,
87 S.E. 126 (1915); Blacknall v. Parish, 59 N.C. 70 (1860).
'Harrell v. Powell, 251 N.C. 636, 112 S.E.2d 81 (1960) ; Mills v. Tabor,
182 N.C. 722, 109 S.E. 850 (1921); Sills v. Bethea, 178 N.C. 315, 100 S.E.
593 (1919).
' See cases cited note 7 supra.
'A promise founded on natural love and affection, according to the great
weight of authority is gratuitous and unenforceable. See, e.g., Stewart v.
Damron, 63 Ariz. 158, 160 P.2d 321 (1945); Stabler v. Ramsay, 30 Del.
Ch. 439, 62 A.2d 464 (1948); Wright v. Polk Gen. Hosp., Inc., 95 Ga. App.
821, 99 S.E.2d 162 (1957); Exum v. Lynch, 188 N.C. 392, 125 S.E. 15
(1924). According to a few decisions, however, love and affection growing
out of the relationship of parent and child are sufficient consideration to up-
hold the contract. Dawley v. Dawley's Estate, 60 Colo. 73, 152 Pac. 1171
(1915); Arnold v. Arnold's Ex'x, 314 Ky. 734, 237 S.W.2d 58 (1951);
Doty v. Dickey, 29 Ky. L. Rep. 900, 96 S.W. 544 (1906). In Puterbaugh
v. Puterbaugh, 131 Ind. 288, 30 N.E. 519 (1892), the court held that the fact
that affection formed an element of consideration in an agreement by an uncle
to make a deed of land to his nephew who had lived with him for twenty-four
years would not impair the force of the contract to convey land. However,
the nephew had fully performed his part of the contract by moving onto the
land and giving his time and labor in improving it.
In Stanback v. Citizens' Natl Bank, 197 N.C. 292, 148 S.E. 313 (1929),
the court said that the recited consideration of one dollar and the grantor's
love and affection for her nephew "is not 'valuable,' that is, not 'founded in
motives of justice'; but it is 'good'-founded on a motive of generosity and
therefore merely voluntary or gratuitous and without valuable consideration."
Id. at 294, 148 S.E. at 314. The court further said that the recital of the
inconsequential sum of one dollar was a mere matter of customary form.
Ibid.
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The court has said in Sills v. Betheaj0 wherein the wife brought
suit to recover property after her husband's death, that although
the deed of a married woman was invalid to pass title without the
written assent of her husband, it was a good and sufficient contract
to convey. The court pointed out that during the husband's lifetime
the contract could be enforced only by an action for damages11
because the husband could not be compelled to give his written
assent, but after the husband's death and the removal of the re-
strictions of coverture there was no obstacle to the requirement
that she comply with her contract by specific performance. There-
fore, on breach of her contract to convey her land, she is liable for
damages and sale under execution of her land to satisfy the
judgment;"2 or if her husband has predeceased her, specific per-
formance to convey may be enforced against her."3 Thus, by in-
direction the alieriation of her land without the consent of her hus-
band may be accomplished.
The one remaining disability growing out of the marital unity
of husband and wife seems to be that a married woman cannot con-
vey her realty without the written assent of her husband. She may
acquire and hold any kind of property and without any restriction
whatever, dispose of her personalty;"4 contract freely except as to
her realty between herself and her husband;5 draw checks; ' O make
10 178 N.C. 315, 100 S.E. 593 (1919).
1 See, e.g., Everett v. Ballard, 174 N.C. 16, 93 S.E. 385 (1917); Warren
v. Dail, 170 N.C. 406, 87 S.E. 126 (1915).1"Miles v. Walker, 179 N.C. 479, 102 S.E. 884 (1920); Everett v.
Ballard, 174 N.C. 16, 93 S.E. 385 (1917) ; Thrash v. Ould, 172 N.C. 728, 90
S.E. 915 (1916); Warren v. Dail, 170 N.C. 406, 87 S.E. 126 (1915); Lipin-
sky v. Revell, 167 N.C. 508, 83 S.E. 756 (1914). The court said in Thrash v.
Ould, supra at 731, 90 S.E. at 916, "[I1t is no longer an open question, but
is settled, that a married woman is liable upon her contracts, . . . and that
under execution issued upon said judgment her property, real and'personal,
can be sold to the same extent as if she had remained single, though the debt
has not been charged thereon by her."
1" Harrell v. Powell, 251 N.C. 636, 112 S.E.2d 81 (1960) ; Sills v. Bethea,
178 N.C. 315, 100 S.E. 593 (1919).
"
4N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-1 (1950); Rea v. Rea, 156 N.Cz 529, 72 S.E.
873 (1911); Ball v. Paquin, 140 N.C. 83, 52 S.E. 410 (1905); Vann v. Ed-
wards, 135 N.C. 661, 47 S.E. 784 (1904).
1" N.C. Gmx. STAT. § 52-2 (1950) provides: "Subject to the provisions of§ 52-12, regulating contracts of wife with husband affecting corpus or income
of estate, every married woman is authorized to contract and deal so as to
affect her real and personal property in the same manner and with the same
effect as if she were unmarried, but no conveyance of her real estate shall be
valid unless made with the written assent of her husband as provided by
section six of article ten of the Constitution, and the execution of the same
19631
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a will" and her husband has no right to dissent therefrom ;18 insure
her husband's life;19 her earnings are her own property;20 she may
sue alone for any damages for personal injuries or other tort sus-
tained by her and such recovery is her own property ;2 she is liable
for her antenuptial debts, contracts and torts ;22 she is liable for her
torts and for costs or fines incurred in any criminal proceeding
against her;2 and she may sue her husband both in contract and
in tort.2 4 Assuming the husband gives his written consent to the
sale of her land, the money derived therefrom immediately becomes
personalty, and under the constitution and implementing statute,
the wife's sole and separate property, free from the control and debts
of her husband. 5
acknowledged or proven as required by law." This section was held constitu-
tional as valid exercise of legislative power in Warren v. Dail, 170 N.C. 406,
87 S.E. 126 (1915).6 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-3 (1950).
"' N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-8 (Supp. 1961) provides: "Every married woman
21 years of age or over has power to devise and bequeath her real and personal
estate as if she were a feme sole; and her will shall be proved as is required
of other wills."
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30-1 (Supp. 1961) accorded to husband and wife
reciprocal rights of dissent to the will of the other, but Dudley v. Staton, 257
N.C. 572, 126 S.E.2d 590 (1962), denied this right to the husband by its
ruling that such provision is an unconstitutional abridgement of a wife's right
to make a will of her property as provided in N.C. CoNST. art. X, § 6, and
the implementing statute N.C. GEN. STAT. §'52-1 (1950), "as if she were
unmarried." However, the wife retains her right to dissent from her hus-
band's will of his separate property. See 41 N.C.L. Rsv. 311 (1963) and
1963 DuKE. L.J. 161.
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-9 (1950) provides: "Any feme covert in her own
name, or in the name of a trustee with his assent, may cause to be insured
for any definite time the life of her husband, for her sole and separate use,
and she may dispose of the interest in the same by will, notwithstanding her
coverture."
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-10 (1950).
"
1Ibid. Helmstetler v. Duke Power Co., 224 N.C. 821, 32 S.E.2d 611
(1945) (husband's common law right of action transferred to wife); Croom
v. Goldsboro Lumber Co., 182 N.C. 217, 108 S.E. 735 (1921) (separate earn-
ings belong to her; may sue alone to recover); Kirkpatrick v. Crutchfield,
178 N.C. 348, 100 S.E. 602 (1919) (joinder of husband unnecessary).22 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-14 (1950).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-15 (1950) (abolishing common law liability of
husband for tort of wife).
2' N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-10.1 (Supp. 1961). In re Will of Witherington,
186 N.C. 152, 119 S.E. 11 (1923) held that a married woman has the fullest
power to bring actions in all cases, even against her husband. Crowell v.
Crowell, 181 N.C. 66, 106 S.E. 149 (1921) held that a wife's right to sue
her husband extended to tort actions.
" N.C. CONST. art. X, § 6; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-1 (1950); Vann v.
Edwards, 135 N.C. 661, 47 S.E. 784 (1904).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
The requirement that she be joined by her husband in her deed
is not immune to legislative alteration. This is shown by statutes
making the wife a free trader and dispensing with the necessity of
joinder of the husband in cases of certain leases of her realty, legal
separation, abandonment by the husband, and his insanity, all of
which have been upheld as valid legislative limitations on art. X,
section 6.26
The husband's veto power over his wife's conveyance of her real
property by his failure or refusal to join in her conveyance is at
most an anomalous nuisance impeding freedom of conveyance of real
property.17  The requirement that a husband join in his wife's
conveyance is a relic of feudalism2" and has long been abolished in
England and in nearly all the states.2 9  Prior to* 1945, a separate
" Keys v. Tuten, 199 N.C. 368, 154 S.E. 631 (1930); Lancaster v.
Lancaster, 178 N.C. 22, 100 S.E. 120 (1919); Bachelor v. Norris, 166 N.C.
506, 82 S.E. 839 (1914); Vaniford v. Humphrey, 139 N.C. 65, 51 S.E.
893 (1905); Vann v. Edwards, 135 N.C. 661, 47 S.E. 784 (1904); Finger
v. Hunter, 130 N.C. 529, 41 S.E. 890 (1902); Hall v. Walker, 118 N.C. 377,
24 S.E. 6 (1896) ; N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 52-4 to -6 (1950). These legislative
limitations have been restated and otherwise implemented by N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 52-1 to -3, -7, -8 (1950). See Bolich, Election, Dissent and Re-
nunciation, 39 N.C.L. REv. 17, 28 (1960).
In 1955 N.C. CONST. art. X, § 6 was amended by providing as follows:
"Every married woman may exercise powers of attorney conferred upon
her by her husband, including the power to execute and acknowledge deeds
to property owned by her or by herself and her husband or by her husband."
(Emphasis added.)
2' The rule that the husband must join in order to validate her deed makes
it hazardous for a grantee to accept a title which has been conveyed by a
woman since he may be buying a lawsuit and he may lose the property, but
as previously noted he may still have his action for damages. In Buford v.
Mochy, 224 N.C. 235, 29 S.E.2d 729 (1944) (4-3 decision), a woman signed
a deed without disclosing the fact that six days prior thereto she had gone
into another state and remarried the-husband from whom she had been di-
vorced. Later she was allowed to recover the property on the ground that
she had not been joined by her husband.
2 In the absence of a statute permitting a married woman to manage and
control her separate estate as if she were a feme sole, she does not have the
capacity to convey land unless her husband joins in the convyance. BturY,
REAL PROPERTY § 239 (1953); 5 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 1359 (3d ed.
1939).
2 Warren v. Dail, 170 N.C. 406, 87 S.E. 126 (1915). The requirement
of the husband's joinder has been abolished in all states except Alabama,
Florida, Indiana, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania. 1 PowELL, REAL PROP-
ERTY § 118 (1949). A. A. CODE tit. 34, § 73 (1959) (husband must join in
deed but not in her lease); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 693.01 (1944) (joinder not
required by constitution); IND. STAT. ANN. § 38-102 (Bums 1949), "Pro-
vided, however, that she shall be bound by estoppel in pais, like any other
person." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-1 (1950); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 64
(1930). As of 1961, a married woman in Texas may elect to have the "sole
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and private examination was required for the wife in dealing with
her separate property, the court saying that this was "to secure her
against coercion and undue influence from him."' 0 Now that this
protective factor against the influence of the husband in her dealings
with third persons has been removed,"' we are left with his "veto
power" 32 over her real property transactions "to afford her his
protection against the wiles and insidious arts of others .... ,,
The court in Stallings v. Walker, 4 explained the requirement that
the husband join in his wife's deed more realistically with these
words:
It is true that the husband, under our Constitution, Art. X,
sec. 6, has no interest as husband in his wife's property, real or
personal. The provision that he must give his written assent to
conveyances by her of realty is the sole survival in our Consti-
tution of the ancient idea that a wife must be under the guardian-
ship and control of her husband and is incompetent to transact
business. This requirement in our Constitution is omitted in
nearly all other State constitutions. It is not based upon his
having any interest in his wife's land, nor on his having a vested
interest therein at her death, for she has full authority to devise
the same without his consent and deprive him of any in-
terest .... 34a
Under our law the husband has no right to dissent from his
wife's will, 5 although she may dissent from his will. 6 The husband
management, control and disposition of her separate property" and convey
it without the joinder of her husband. TEX. Civ. STAT. art. 4614(d)
(Vernon Supp. 1962). The desirability of a statute validating deeds by
married women is discussed in 12 FLA. L.J. 245 (1938).
" Ferguson v. Kinsland, 93 N.C. 337, 339 (1885).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47-14.1 (Supp. 1961). This section does not repeal
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-12 (1950), requiring private examination of the wife
when conveying her real property to her husband. Honeycutt v. Citizens
Nat'l Bank, 242 N.C. 734, 89 S.E.2d 598 (1955).
32 Stallings v. Walker, 176 N.C. 321, 324, 97 S.E. 25, 26 (1918).
Ferguson v. Kinsland, 93 N.C. 337, 339 (1885).
176 N.C. 321, 97 S.E. 25 (1918).
81Id. at 323-24, 97 S.E. at 26. (Emphasis added.)
"8 See note 18 supra. Gomer v. Askew, 242 N.C. 547, 89 S.E.2d 117
(1955). See DOUGLAS, ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATES IN NORTH CAROLINA
§§ 18, 48, 158 (1948). The rights of husband and wife to dissent from each
others' wills are the same in most states except Florida, Georgia, Missouri
and North Carolina. In most jurisdictions the surviving spouse is given by
statute full discretionary power to dissent. A few states in addition to
North Carolina qualify the right. See KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 59-602(2)
(1949); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 59-603 (Supp. 1961) ; LA. CIv. CODE art.
2382 (1952); MIss. CODE ANN. §§ 667-70 (1957); N.Y. DECED. EST. LAw
§ 18; N.C. Gz:N. STAT. § 30-1 (Supp. 1961).
"' "Under the statute in effect and operative as to persons dying prior to
[Vol. 42
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has- a veto power over the conveyances of his wife of her separate
realty although he has no interest, therein. The wife has no similar
veto power over the conveyances of her husband of his separate
realty except that without her joinder it remains subject to the
elective life estate. 7 His separate deed is valid while her separate
deed is invalid. Thus the right of husband and wife to transfer their
respective separate property is unequal. It would seem that public
policy would be better served if the legal rights of the husband and
wife in each other's property were the same. This would involve an
amendment to our constitution which would empower the General
Assembly to eliminate the distinction in treatment of the property
rights of husband and wife as now found in the law and give the
General Assembly the power to make their rights equal. By equal-
izing their rights, the husband could dissent from his wife's will
under the same provisions as provided for the wife's dissent under
the Intestate Succession Act." Instead of the husband's joinder
in his wife's deed being'a condition precedent to its validity, his
joinder would only signify a release of his power of election. 9 In
this manner neither spouse could pauperize or leave the other desti-
tute on society.
In the principal case the husband had no interest in the land, yet
his failure to *join in her deed defeated the obvious intent of the
grantor that her children by her first, marriage have the property
which had belonged to their father and to her as tenants by the
entirety and which had come to her as survivor., This requirement
of assent seems to be anachronistic and paradoxical in view of the
reiloval of practiqally all of the legalistic comm6n law disabilities
imposed upon a married woman, and, at best, seems; to'burden the
July 1, 1960, the effect of a dissent was to give the. widow the same rights
and estateg in real and personal property'6f her husband as if he had died
ihtestate, i.e., dower, year's allowance, 'and intestate share."' Bolich, supra
note '36, at 32: .N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 28-149, 29-1 (8), 30-2 t6-5, -15 (1950).
Chdshire.v. Drewry, 213 N.C. 450, 197 S.E. 1 (.1938). DOUGLAS, op. cit.
supra. note 46, §§ 18, 48(c). The 1959 Session of the General Assembly
abolished dower'and curtesy. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-4 (Supp. 1961). Un-
der'-the n'ew act the right to dissent is: confined to' situations where she re-
ceives leis. than a certain minimum share as defined therein. N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 30-1 to -3 (Supp. 1961). 1 .I
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-30 (Supp. 1961) (electibn' to -take life interest
in'li~u" of intesfafe share).' "
-
8
"'N.C.'GEN. STAT. §§30-1 to -3 (Supp. 1961), as, amended N.C. GEN."
STAT. § 30-1(a) (Supp. 1961).
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-30 (Supp. 1961).
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transfer of realty without providing any substantial benefits to either
spouse. The remedy for this situation calls for an amendment to the
present constitution, which, with respect to this requirement, seems
both illogical and outmoded.
ANN H. PHILLIPs
Federal Jurisdiction-Three Judge Courts-Abstention-
Appellate Jurisdiction
Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. v. Epstein' makes two sig-
nificant decisions dealing with the jurisdiction of three judge courts
and appeal from a district court's denial to convene such a court.
The result is to simplify and clarify this area of federal jurisdiction.
A novel feature of our judicial system, the three judge federal
court is an important buffer in the conflict of state and federal law.
A three judge court is properly convened when petitioner seeks to
enjoin the enforcement of a state or federal statute as being un-
constitutional.2 If the case is proper the district judge certifies the
case to the chief judge of the circuit, who convenes the special
court. The full court includes in its three members one circuit
judge and the district judge before whom the case is pending."
Appeal lies directly to the Supreme Court.'
The three judge court was created by Congress in response to
public demand. Ex Parte Young5 held that a single federal district
judge could enjoin a state official from enforcing an unconstitutional
1370 U.S. 713 (1962) (per .uriam).
2 "An interlocutory or permanent injunction restraining the enforcement,
operation or execution of any State statute by restraining the action of any
officer of such State in the enforcement or execution of such statute or of an
order made by an administrative board or commission acting under State
statutes, shall not be granted by any district court or judge thereof upon
the ground of the unconstitutionality of such statute unless the application
therefor is heard and determined by a district court of three judges under
section 2284 of this title." 28 U.S.C. §2281 (1958). 28 U.S.C. §2282
(1958) applies the same rule to federal statutes. 28 U.S.C. § 2284 (1958)
outlines the composition and procedure of the three judge court. Other
actions requiring a three judge court are cases seeking to set aside an order
of the Interstate Commerce Commission, 28 U.S.C. § 2325 (1950) and to en-
join a violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act in which an expediting cer-
tificate has been filed by the U.S. Attorney General, 63 Stat. 107 (1949), 15
U.S.C. § 28 (1958).
328 U.S.C. § 2284(1) (1958).
'28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1958). Direct appeal is allowed because of the
dignity of the special court and the cases are generally of extreme im-
portance. See 47 Gro. L.J. 161, 169 (1958).209 U.S. 123 (1908).
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state statute. That a single federal district judge could overturn
state legislation was a great affront to state pride and dignity.6
Further, "legislative history . . . indicates that the three judge
court sections . . .were enacted to prevent a single federal judge
from being able to paralyze totally the operation of an entire regu-
latory scheme, either state or federal, by issuance of a broad in-
junctive order." 7
Judicial interpretation has limited the jurisdiction of these
courts. The statutes creating them are not a statement of broad
social policy but are to be strictly construed.8 There must be a
substantial federal question-if the statute is clearly constitutional9
or unconstitutional" the district judge is not required to call a three
judge court. Petitioner must attack the constitutionality of the
statute itself; an allegation of unconstitutional application is in-
sufficient.11 However a three judge court may assume jurisdiction
of collateral issues if properly joined with an allegation that the
statute is unconstitutional.' 2 An injunction must be sought," and a
statewide statute must be attacked, not a local ordinance.' 4 Nor do
three judges hear counterclaims 5 or contempt actions,', or cases
involving only private litigants.'7
The single district judge before whom the case is first presented
has limited power. He can only determine whether the case pre-
sented comes within the statutory requirements for a three judge
court, whether the complaint alleges a basis for equitable relief,
' Hutcheson, A Case for Three Judges, 47 HARv. L. REV. 795 (1934).
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
'Phillips v. United States, 312 U.S. 246 (1941).
'E.g., California Water Serv. Co. v. City of Redding, 304 U.S. 252(1938); Ex Parte Poresky, 290 U.S. 30 (1933) (per curiam).
10 Turner v. City of Memphis, 369 U.S. 350 (1962) (per curiam); Baily
v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31 (1962) (per curiam). See 50 CALIF. L. REv. 728(1962).
Phillips v. United States, 312 U.S. 246 (1941).
12 Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Jacobsen, 362 U.S. 73
(1960); cf. Hum v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238 (1933).
"Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963); Harlan v.
Pennsylvania R.R., 180 F. Supp. 725 (W.D. Penn. 1960).
" Rorich v. Board of Comm'rs of Everglades Drainage Dist., 307 U.S.
208 (1939); Ex Parte Collins, 277 U.S. 565 (1928).
Public Service Comm'n of Missouri v. Brasher Freight Lines, 306 U.S.
204 (1939).
18 Pendergist v. United States, 314 U.S. 574 (1941), rev'd on other
grounds, 317 U.S. 412 (1943).
"
T International Ladies Garment Workers v. Donnelly Garment Co., 304
U.S. 243 (1938).
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and whether the constitutional question is substantial.' If these
criteria are met 'he must certify the case to the chief judge who will
Convene the three judge court. To prevent irreparable damage
though, the single judge can issue a temporary restraining order
to remain in force only until the full hearing,"9 but he cannot deter-
mine the case on the merits.2" If the district judge refuses to order
a three judge court, then mandamus will lie to the Supreme Court.21
If there is no substantial federal question22 or the case is otherwise
improper,23 the single judge may dismiss. His determination of
the existence of a substantial federal question may be appealed to
the court of appeals. 4
Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. v. Epstein2 makes two
additional inroads into the field of three judge courts.- Idlewild
first holds that the single district judge cannot decide to abstain.2 ,
Petitioner sold liquor to overseas passengers at an international air
terminal, delivery being made upon the buyer's arrival at his foreign
destination. Being advised by New York state authorities that his
business was illegal under state statutes, petitioner sought to enjoin
enforcement of the statute as being unconstitutional under the com-
1
"Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. v. Epstein, 370 U.S. 713 (1962)
(per curiam).
' 28 U.S.C. §2284(3) (1958).
20 Stratton v. St. Louis S.W. Ry., 282 U.S. 10 (1930).
" E.g., Ex Parte Bransford, 310 U.S. 354 (1940); Stratton v. St. Louis
S.W. Ry., supra note 20.2 2 E.g., Ex Parte Poresky, 290 U.S. 30 (1933); German v. South Carolina
Ports- Authority, 295 F.2d 491 (4th Cir. 1961). This includes the deter-
mination that the statute is clearly constitutional or unconstitutional. *See
cases cited notes 8-10 supra.
Jacobs v. Tawes, 250 F.2d 611 (4th Cir. 1957) (lack of jurisdictional
amount); Harlan v. Pennsylvania R.R., 180 F. Supp. 725 (W.D. Pehn.
1960) '(no injunction sought).
24 Bell v. Waterfront Comm'n of New York Harbor, 279 F.2d 853 (2d
Cir. 1960); White v. Gates, 253 F.2d 868 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 356
U.S. 973 (1958).
-Z 370 U.S. 713 (1962) (per curiam).
2 Equitable abstention is the principle that the "federal courts should
not adjudicate the constitutionality of state enactments fairly open to inter-
pretation until the state courts have been afforded reasonable opportunity to
pass on them." Haxrison v. NAACP, 360 -U.S. 167, 176 (1959); accord,
Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943) (complicated state regitlatory
system); Great "Lakes Dredge & Drydock. Co. v... Huffman, 319 U.S. 293
(1943) (state taxation); Railroad Comm'n of Texas v. Pullman, 312,U.S
496. (1941) (,constitutional questidn with unsettled state law). See Wright,
The Abstention Doctrine Reconsidered, 37 TEX. L. REv. 815 (1959); Note,
59 CoLum. L. REv. 749 (1959). But see,-.e.g., Louisiana Power & Light Co.
v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959), where abstention is exercised in
other than constitutional questions.
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merce clause and the supremacy clause. Petitioner's request for a
three judge court was denied by the district judge on the grounds
that, the federal- court should retain jurisdiction but abstain until.
the question was initially decided by the state courts, even though no.
state action was pending at the time .
7 2
The Supreme Court, in.a per curiam, opinion s held that-the,
decision to abstain is to be, made by three judges because it is a
decision' on the merits and thus improper for a single judge. 9
It can be argued that abstention is a threshold jurisdictional
decision, similar to the substantial question determination 0  There
is- no determination of rights or duties.. Abstention. is simply a
decision that the federal court should not hear the case. Further,
the cases3 ' allowing. the single judge to decide the substantial ques-
tion issue are indicative of a Supreme Court policy to restrict rather
than broaden the use of three judge courts. The convening of a
three judge court is a time consuming and costly process 32 and since
the purpose of the statute is to avoid improvident invalidation of
state statutes, policy reasons favor a single judge deciding the matter
of abstention.3 3  Also abstention is an. area marked by delay and
frustration34 and the convening of three judges adds to the delay.
"Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. v. Rohan, 188 F. Supp. 434
(S.D.N.Y. 1960).
- Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. v. Epstein, 370 U.S. 713 (1963)
(per curiam).
" Snyder's Drug Storei,' Inc. v. Taylor, 227 F.2d 162 (8th Cir. 1955)
holds that a single judge can abstain, but does not give supporting rationale.
A three judge court can abstain. E.g., Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167
(1959).
, 047 IowA L. Rrv. 534, 537 (1962).
E.-g., Ex Parte Poresky, 290 U.S. 30 (1933); Baily v. Patterson, 369
U.S. 31 (1962,); notes 9 & 10 supra and accompanying'-text.
32 "[T] he requiremefit of three 'judges, of whom one -must be a Justice
of this Court or a circuit judge, entails a serious drain upon the federal
judicial system particularly in regions where, despite modern facilities, dis-
tance still plays an important part in the administration of justice. And
all but a few of the great metropolitan areas are such regions. Moreover,
inasmuch as this procedure also brings direct review of a district court to
this court,' any loose'-construction 6f the requirements ,of § 266 [§ 2281]
would defeat the purposes of Congress, as expressed in the Jurisdictional
Act of February 1925, to keep within narrov confines our appellate docket."
Phillips v. United States, 312 U.S.'246, 250 (1941).
See 47 IOWA L. REV. 534, 538 (1962).
The 'three-judg6 coiurt called pursuant t6.-the decision in the pfincipal
case refused to abstain because of the delay and expense already 'incurred
by the petitioner. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. v.-Epstein,-212 F. Sipp.
376 (S D.N.Y. '1962). But see Government & Civic Employees Organizing
Comm.,, CIO. v. Wiridsor, 353 U.S. 364 (1957); vhere appellant tvie .reathed
the Supreme Court witout ever, having his case heard.:on -the merits:'
19631.
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Under close examination, however, it becomes apparent that the
substantial question determination and the decision to abstain are
different. The former is to determine if jurisdiction exists, because
a substantial question is a jurisdictional requirement for the con-
vening of a three judge court.35 Also the single judge has no dis-
cretion. If the outcome of the case is clear, he must dismiss.
Abstention presupposes jurisdiction. 8  In abstaining a court
declines, for policy reasons, to hear a case of which it has jurisdic-
tion. The decision to abstain is not automatic but is based on a
weighing of factors.3 This seems a proper function for three
judges, since the statute indicates that the single judge's functions
be almost ministerial in nafure.8
Furthermore, if a substantial question exists, the single judge
should not deny relief to either party. Withholding relief is the
same as granting it. The single judge cannot grant an injunction.
Conversely he should not be able to deny petitioner's request.8 9
Also there is no temptation for the single judge to use abstention
as an excuse to avoid convening a three judge court because the
procedure would disrupt his docket as well as that of the court of
appeals.
The second significant holding of Idlewild deals with appellate
review and restricts the interpretation to be given Stratton v. St.
Louis S.W. Ry.4" In Stratton a district judge granted a temporary
restraining order but later dismissed the bill for want of equity. 41
The court of appeals reversed on the merits, not on the question
of the propriety of three judges. 42  On its own motion the Supreme
Court held that the single judge had no jurisdiction to hear the
case on the merits, a three judge court being proper, and that,
therefore, the court of appeals was without jurisdiction.48
In Idlewild the court of appeals also decided that abstention was
a decision on the merits proper only for a three judge court. How-
ExRz Parte Poresky, 290 U.S. 30 (1933).
Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. v. Rohan, 289 F.2d 426, 429
(1961).
" NAACP v. Bennett, 360 U.S. 471 (1959).
"S See Bowen, Where are Three Federal Judges Required?, 16 MINN.
L. REv. 1, 17 (1931).
"'Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. v. Epstein, 370 U.S. 713 (1962)
(per curiam).
40282 U.S. 10 (1930).
,St. Louis S.W. Ry. v. Emmerson, 27 F.2d 1005 (S.D. Ill. 1928).
"St. Louis S.W. Ry. v. Emmerson, 30 F.2d 322 (7th Cir. 1929).
,Stratton v. St. Louis S.W. Ry., 282 U.S. 10 (1930).
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-ever, it thought itself unable to give petitioner relief,"4 holding that
under Stratton it had no jurisdiction, and dismissed.4 5 In doing
so it gave Stratton a broad interpretation and held that it was pre-
cluded from hearing the question of jurisdiction as well as deciding
the merits4 -though admitting it was in the anomalous position of
finding the district court in error and being unable to give relief.
The Supreme Court limited the interpretation to be given
Stratton. Though the per curiam opinion is not explicit, it ap-
parently holds that Stratton is authority only for the point that the
court of appeals cannot decide the merits of an issue within the juris-
diction of a three judge court. Thus, if the court of appeals finds
that the district court had jurisdiction, it can review the merits of
the case; and if it finds that the district judge did not have juris-
diction, it can remand the case with instructions to convene a three
judge court.
Before Idlewild petitioner's only safe course, upon being denied
a three judge court, was to file both a petition for mandamus with
the Supreme Court and an appeal with the court of appeals.4 7 Man-
damus was thought necessary to compel the convening of a three
judge court. Appeal was provident, since if mandamus were denied
petitioner might find that his time for appeal on the merits had
lapsed." Since one or the other would consequently prove unneces-
sary, petitioner bore an expensive burden. Also such a procedural
route resulted in piecemeal determination of the case.49
"Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. v. Rohan, 289 F.2d 426 (2d Cir.
1961).
"' Petitioner started anew and again sought a three judge court but the
second district judge refused to overrule the prior denial of another district
court. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. v. Rohan, 194 F. Supp. 3
(S.D.N.Y. 1961).
"' There was a split of authority on this question. Some circuits dis-
missed, citing Stratton. Waddell v. Chicago Land Clearing Comm'n, 206
F.2d 748 (7th Cir. 1953) (dictum); Riss & Co. v. Hoch, 99 F.2d 553 (10th
Cir. 1938). Other courts vacated the order of the single judge, but apparent-
ly the present question was not squarely faced. Two Guys from Harrison-
Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley, 266 F.2d 427 (3rd Cir. 1959); Board of Super-
visors v. Tureaud, 207 F.2d 807 (5th Cir. 1953), vacated on other grounds,
347 U.S. 971 (1959) (per curiam). In Two Guys from Harrison-Allen-
town, Inc. v. McGinley, supra, the first district judge held a three judge
court proper. A second judge dismissed the complaint. The court of appeals
held the second judge was without jurisdiction and vacated his order.
" In Idlewild petitioner sought both certiorari and mandamus. 368 U.S.
812 (1961).
"861 COLUm. L. REv. 1358, 1362 (1961); 47 IowA L. R.v. 534, 541
(1962).
Ibid.
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.As a. result of Idlewild, appeal to the court of appeals now pro-
vides, a complete remedy wheA, a district judge improperly refuses
to convene a three judge court. If the court of appeals finds that
the--single judge did not have jurisdiction, it can proceed with the
merits. If a three judge court is proper, it can be so ordered.
There is no need to delay proceeding by seeking mandamus from
the Supreme Court ffor mandamus does not consider the merits;
it merely orders the convening of a three judge court.
The procedural result of Idlewild is a much needed simplifica-
tion of review procedure. Procedural pitfalls and piecemeal deter-
mination have been eliminated and an uncertain area made uniform
and clear.
CHARLES MONROE WHEDBEE
Pleadings-Alternative Joinder of Defendants
The Supreme Court of North Carolina has again considered
the application of the alternative joinder of defendants statute1 in
Conger v. Travelers Ins. Co.2 Prior to the decision, the status of
the statute was very questionable.3 The instant case has done much
to sweep aside the confusion.
In Conger, the plaintiff alleged alternatively two causes of action.
In. the first clause, plaintiff alleged that she was the named bene-
ficiary of a group life insurance policy issued by the defendant,
Travelers, which policy insured the life of deceased; that the
deceased died while the policy was fully effective; that payment to
fhe plaintiff under the terms of the policy had been refused by
Tiravrelers; and that the plaintiff was entitled to full payment from
Trayelers in the amount of $8000. In the second cause of action,
50 Apparently mandamus is still available, to petitioner. See cases cited
note 21 supra. However, mandamus will usually iot issue where appellate,
reyv-ew is available, even though the Court can, in its discretion, issue the
writ in exceptional and appropriate cases. Ex Parte Republic of Peru, 318.
U.S. 578 (1943); Ex Parte United States, 287 U.S. 241 (1932). in.
Idlewild'the Court granted both certiorari and heard the petition for man-'
d.rpus.. 3,68 U.S. 812'(1961).
-.':'N.C. iRN. STAT. § 1-69 (1953).'
"-"'260 N.C.J l12, 131 S.E.2d 889 (1963).
State x rel Cain r. Corbett, 235 N.C. 33, 69 S.E.2d 20 (1952); Foote
v. C. W. "Davis & Co.,"230 N.C. 422, 53 S.E.2d 311 (1949) (Although the"
cburtr did not construe the irtatute,' it was a case for the application of the
statute.); Peitzman v. Town of Zebulon, 219 N.C. 473, 14 S.E.2d 416
(i941) ;" Smith Iv. Greensboro Joini Stock Land Bank, 213 N.C. 343, 196
S.E. 481 (1938); Grady v. Warren, 201 N.C. 693, 161 S.E. 319 (1931).
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the plaintiff alleged alternatively that if Travelers was not liable
to the plaintiff for the $8000, then the defendant, Colonial Stores,
was liable. Pursuant to this allegation the plaintiff pleaded that
the deceased had a contract with Colonial Stores whereby Colonial
Stores was to deduct a certain amount per week from deceased's
salary to pay a portion of the premiums of the insurance policy; that
Colonial Stores had, in fact, so deducted the amount up to thirty-one
days prior to deceased's death; and that if Colonial Stores had not
remitted the premiums to Travelers in accordance with the contract,
then Colonial Stores should be liable to the plaintiff for the $8000,
Both Travelers and Colonial Stores demurred to the complaint
on the ground that there was a misjoinder of causes and parties.
The trial court sustained the demurrer. On appeal, the Supreme
Court reversed.
The opinion of the court, in effect, summarized the case law
of North Carolina on alternative joinder of defendants, clearing up,
to some extent, several prior irreconcilable decisions which were
the subject of two previous articles in the Review.' The court
considered in great detail the effect that the statutory provision
that "all causes must affect all parties"5 has upon section 1-69' of
the General Statutes authorizing alternative joinder of defendants.
Thus the main issue in the case was whether or not, in the case of
alternative joinder of defendants, all causes must affect all parties;
and if they must, did they-do so here.
In its decision, the court has reconciled the two sections by
saying that both causes, though phrased in the alternative, do in
fact, affect both parties. This is true in the sense that if one de-
' Brandis and Graham, Recent Developments in the Field of Permissive
Joinder of Parties and Causes in North Carolina, 34 N.C.L. REV. 405, 422
(1956); Brandis, Permissive Joinder of Parties and Causes in North Caro-
lina, 25 N.C.L. REv. 1, 43 (1946).5N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-123 (1953): "The plaintiff may unite in the
same complaint several causes of action .... But the causes of action so
united . .. must affect all the parties to the action ......
a N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-69 (1953): "All persons may be made defendants,
jointly, severally, or in the alternative, who have, or claim, an interest in
the controversy adverse to the plaintiff, or who are necessary parties to a
complete determination or settlement of the questions involved. In an
action to recover the possession of real estate, the landlord and tenant may
be joined as defendants. Any person claiming title or right of possession
to real estate may be made a party plaintiff or defendant, as the case
requires, in such action. If the plaintiff is in doubt as to the persons from
whom he is entitled to redress, he may join" two or more defendants, to de-
termine which is liable."
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fendant is held liable, the other cannot be held liable. The court
so held and denoted the theory as "mutual exclusiveness" of
remedies.7
Prior to Conger, in Grady v. Warren," the court had indicated
that section 1-69 could be applied only where a single cause of
action is stated.' This indication was negated by a subsequent
decision in Peitzman v. Town of Zebulon.'0 In Peitzman, the
plaintiff sued the Town of Zebulon on a contract. Later he amended
to join an ex-mayor of the town and ex-city clerk as additional
parties defendant."1 Plaintiffs joined the former officers in a
second cause of action for wrongfully making and inducing the
plaintiff to enter into the contract. Thus, there were alternative
defendants, and two causes of action, one in contract and one in
tort. The court allowed the joinder, and treated the two causes as
arising out of the same transaction, thereby complying with the
requirements for joinder of causes.'"
The Peitznan decision left this question unanswered: Could
there be alternative joinder of parties and causes where there were
alternative facts ?"s Concerning this point the court said in Peitz-
man, "There are no alternative facts alleged, the only alternative
involved under the allegations is as to which of the defendants is
liable." 4 The court in Conger realized that Peitzman had not said
that there could be no alternative joinder if there were alternative
facts. It would appear, however, that the heretofore unanswered
question has now been settled by Conger:
The alternative causes are not separate and distinct; they are
so interwoven that if one defendant is liable the other is not.
Of course, neither may be liable. It seems to us that this com-
plaint, though it contains alternative factual allegations, discloses
1260 N.C. 112, 117, 131 S.E.2d 889, 893 (1963). For a full discussion
of the "mutual exclusiveness" doctrine to which the court refers, see
Brandis, Permissive Joinder of Parties and Causes in North Carolina, 25
N.C.L. Rzv. 1, 43 (1946).
8201 N.C. 693, 161 S.E. 319 (1931).
8260 N.C. 112, 114, 131 S.E.2d 889, 892 (1963).
1 219 N.C. 473, 14 S.E.2d 416 (1941).
" Plaintiff amended only after the town answered alleging that the
former officers had made the contract without authority. Ibid.12 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-123 (1953): "But the causes of action so united
must ... affect all parties to the action ...
1825 N.C.L. R!v. 1, 45 (1946).
14219 N.C. 473, 475, 14 S.E.2d 416, 417 (1941).
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one of the situations for which G.S. § 1-69 was passed sixty-three
years after G.S. § 1-123.15
In other words, where there is a single interwoven transaction,
with mutual exclusiveness of the causes, the causes may be joined
in the alternative in spite of alternative factual allegations.
Conger supplies the answer to a further question. Smith v.
Greensboro Joint Stock Land Bank 6 had been decided prior to
Peitzman. It involved a joinder of defendants which, from the
facts,' 7 would appear to have been a case for alternative joinder,
although the decision did not mention this fact. Instead, the court
treated the case as a joinder of inconsistent and contradictory causei
of action, and sustained a demurrer for misjoinder.'8 Acknowl-
edging that Smith did, in fact, involve an alternative joinder of
causes, the court in Conger admits that Smith and Peitzman pose
inconsistent rules, but follows Peitzman because "it seems to us to
reach the conclusion most likely to expedite the prompt administra-
tion of justice."' 9
There is at least one problem left unsolved by Conger in the
alternative joinder field: Will the reasoning applied in Conger be
applicable to an alternative joinder of plaintiffs? Foote v. C. W.
Davis & Co.2" apparently involved alternative claims of two plain-
tiffs.2 The court, however, sustained a demurrer for misjoinder
on the grounds of inconsistency of causes without mentioning al-
ternative joinder of parties plaintiff.2" The language of the court
on the point of inconsistency is interesting: "There is no joint or
1260 N.C. 112, 117, 131 S.E.2d 889, 893 (1963).
16213 N.C. 343, 196 S.E. 481 (1938).
"'In Smith, the plaintiff alleged in his first cause of action that the
defendant bank had foreclosed his mortgage without sufficient power of
sale; that at the foreclosure sale, the bank bought the property through its
agent; and that the property had subsequently been conveyed to the other
defendants in the action. The plaintiff asked in this cause that the sale and
subsequent deeds be set aside. In the second cause, the plaintiff sought
damages against the defendant bank only if it were found that the pur-
chasers from the bank's agent were innocent.
16213 N.C. 343, 346, 196 S.E. 481, 482 (1938).
10260 N.C. 112, 118, 131 S.E.2d 889, 893 (1963).
20 230 N.C. 422, 53 S.E.2d 311 (1949).
'In Foote, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant, Davis, had breached
its contract to buy prunes from the plaintiff. Because Davis set up in de-
fense to the action an allegation that the plaintiff was not the real party
in interest and that the plaintiff was the mere selling agent for Guggen-
hime, plaintiff had Guggenhime joined as a party plaintiff. Obviously, either
one or the other, or neither, but not both in any case, was entitled to recover.
- 230 N.C. 422, 423, 53 S.E.2d 311, 312 (1949).
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common interest in the claim asserted. Instead, each contradicts the
other. If Foote's claim is well-founded, Guggenhime has no in-
terest therein .. ".. 23 This statement would indicate an alternative
joinder, as the language, in effect, is the "mutual exclusiveness"
doctrine.24
That Foote would be controlling in the wake of the Conger
decision is doubtful. Since Conger, however, was limited to a case
of alternative joinder of defendants, some distinction might be made
by the court due to the different wording of the statutes2 5 Section
1-69 of the General Statutes provides for alternative joinder of de-
fendants if the plaintiff is in doubt as to the persons from whom he is
entitled redress, whereas section 1-68 contains no such "doubt
clause" regarding the joinder of plaintiffs. Rationally, this distinc-
tion should make no difference whatsoever.20
A reconsideration of the problem raised by Foote is still needed.
As the situation now stands, multiple defendants may be joined in
the alternative without the worry of having a demurrer for mis-
joinder sustained either on the ground that alternative facts have
been alleged, or on the basis that the plaintiff is proceeding upon
inconsistent theories. The only requirement is that there be "mutual
exclusiveness" of remedies.2 7 The same rule should apply to altern-
ative joinder of plaintiffs, and Conger should be good authority
for avoiding the Foote situation. Further consideration by the
court is necessary, however, before it would be completely safe to
2 Ibid. It must be noted that in Foote there were two separate com-
plaints, and not merely one complaint with causes joined in the alternative.
If this was the basis of the court's ruling that the claims were inconsistent,
it would appear that if the claims were encompassed in a single complaint
phrased in the alternative, the court would overrule a demurrer.
24260 N.C. 112, 117, 131 S.E.2d 889, 893 (1963): "They [the causes]
are so interwoven that if one defendant [plaintiff] is liable [entitled to
recover] the other is not."
5 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-68 (1953): "All persons having an interest
in the subject of the action and in obtaining the relief demanded may bejoined as plaintiffs, either jointly, severally, or in the alternative .... "
Compare this with N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-69 (1953): "All persons may be
made defendants, jointly, severally, or in the alternative, who have, or claim,
an interest in the controversy adverse to the plaintiff .... If the plaintiff
is in doubt as to the person from whom he is entitled to redress, he mayjoin two or more defendants, to determine which is liable." (Emphasis
added.)
28 34 N.C.L. Rav. 405, 424 (1956): "[T]he mere authorization of alterna-
tive joinder of plaintiffs so plainly contemplates a comparable uncertainty,
that such a ground of distinction seems highly improbable."
'260 N.C. 112, 117, 131 S.E.2d 889, 893 (1963).
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say that the attorney could forget the inconsistency notion in alterna-
tive joinder of plaintiffs.
'It would seem that by the Conger decision, North Carolina,
in the alternative joinder situation, is becoming more liberal, per-
haps even approaching the liberality of the Federal Rules.2" It is
hoped that the court will continue "to reach the conclusions most
likely to' expedite the prompt administration of justice."29
ARCH K. ScHocH IV
Quasi-Contract-Expense of Medical Care of Indigent Parent
During the last illness of a parent, it is not unusual for his
children to assume his medical bills. In Deskovick v. Porzio1 the
Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, recently con-
sidered an action to recover such expenses brought by two adult sons
against the estate of their father, on an alleged contract for repay-
ment.
The decedent's illness made his sons reluctant to discuss money
matters with him and testimony indicates that they were erroneously
led to believe that their father was unable to pay his medical bills.2
They assumed and paid the bills, allegedly intending to have an
accounting at some unspecified future date. Since the estate left
by the decedent was more than sufficient to cover his medical
expenses3 they sought recovery, basing their action on a theory of
contract implied in fact.' There could have been no such contract,
" 2 BARRON AND HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 533, at
193 (1961). Rule 20(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was en-
acted in contemplation of procedural economy and provided for, among
other aspects, the alternative joinder of defendants. The authors cite Payne
v. British Time Recorder Co., [1921] 2 K.B. 1, as the forerunner of Rule
20(a). Payne is interesting, therefore, from a historical point of view.
In Payne, plaintiff supplier ordered cards from manufacturer for a cus-
tomer from a sample furnished by manufacturer. On arrival, customer
refused acceptance, alleging variance from the sample. The British court
allowed joinder of customer and manufacturer in the alternative, realizing
that the case, as in Conger, presented one common question: Did the cards
furnished meet the specifications of the sample? This is a case of "mutual
exclusiveness," because recovery against one would definitely preclude re-
covery against the other.
" 260 N.C. 112, 118, 131 S.E.2d 889, 893 (1963).
'78 N.J. Super. 82, 187 A.2d 610 (App. Div. 1963).2 Id. at 85-86, 187 A.2d at 611-12.
8 Id. at 89, 187 A.2d at 613.
'"Contracts are express when their terms are stated by the parties and
are often said to be implied when their terms are not so stated. The dis-
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however, because the decedent had not known that the plaintiffs were
paying his bills.5 In spite of this, the New Jersey Court reversed
the trial court's order of involuntary dismissal with prejudice, but
remanded the case to be tried on a theory of quasi-contract.
In proposing a quasi-contractual theory of recovery8 the court
felt that the plaintiffs were not guilty of officious intermeddling
which would have barred theif recovery as volunteers.7 This is so
since the plaintiffs were the appropriate persons to discharge their
father's financial obligations. The court found, in essence, unjust
enrichment to the estate of the decedent. That the plaintiffs, at the
time they paid the bills, may have had a gratuitous intent was ruled
of no effect because this gratuitous intent was a product of their
mistaken appraisal of the situation.'
No case squarely in point with Deskovick has been found." In
similar cases, however, there appears to be some uncertainty regard-
ing the proper theory of recovery. This is particularly noticeable
in suits to recover for personal services rendered to the decedent,
tinction is not based on legal effect but on the way in which mutual assent
is manifested." 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 3, at 8-9 (3rd ed. 1957); 1
CoRBIN, CONTRACTS § 18 (2d ed. 1963); RESTATEMENT, CONTRAcTs § 5
(1932).
'78 N.J. Super. 82, 86-87, 187 A.2d 610, 611.
° "A quasi-contractual obligation is one that is created by the law for
reasons of justice, without any expression of assent and sometimes even
against a clear expression of dissent." 1 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 19, at 46(2d ed. 1963); 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 3A (3rd ed. 1957). Historically,
quasi-contract relief was awarded under the common counts in the common-
law action of indebitatus assumpsit, on equitable criteria. Archawski v.
Hanioti, 350 U.S. 532 (1956); Herrmann v. Gleason, 126 F.2d 936 (6th
Cir. 1942) ; Dean v. Mattox, 250 N.C. 246, 108 S.E.2d 541 (1959) ; Allgood
v. Wilmington Say. & Trust Co., 242 N.C. 506, 88 S.E.2d 825 (1955) (for
the remedy, not the facts); DAwso N, UNJUST ENRICHMENT 10-26 (1951).
'Schmid v. First Camden Nat'l Bank and Trust Co., 130 N.J. Eq. 254, 22
A.2d 246 (Ch. 1941); Whitehead v. Wilson Knitting Mills, 194 N.C. 281,
139 S.E. 456 (1927); Blacknall v. Hancock, 182 N.C. 369, 109 S.E. 72
(1921).
'The Court relied heavily on RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION § 26 (1936).
"A person is entitled to restitution from another to whom gratuitously and
induced thereto by mistake of fact he has giyen money . . . ." Id. at 116.
Restitution is allowed when the plaintiff has a "mistaken belief in the exist-
ence of facts which would create a moral obligation upon the donor to make
the gift. . . ." Id. at 118.
'In the case of In re Dolgy's Estate, 338 Mich. 567, 61 N.W.2d 649
(1953), the plaintiff had paid hospital expenses incurred by his deceased
father-in-law. Upon the death of the plaintiff's mother-in-law he sued her
estate for reimbursement of her husband's medical bills. The court disallowed
the claim, but indicated that it might have been valid if brought against the
estate of the father-in-law.
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where the courts speak of implied contracts without saying more.10
In such suits to recover for personal services a common case is
one in which a close relative is taken into the plaintiff's home. This
relative is usually aged and infirm, and requires a great deal of
personal attention and nursing. At his death the plaintiff seeks
reimbursement from his estate.11 In determining whether or not
to grant recovery, the courts seek to raise a factual presumption of
a contract to pay.:2 When recovery is denied it is usually because
of a lack of a basis for this presumption.' Occasionally courts will
grant recovery in this situation based either on a theory of quasi-
contract, 14 or one of supplying necessaries to an incompetent. 15
"0 Typical of this hazy delineation is Snyder v. Nixon, 188 Iowa 779,
176 N.W. 808 (1920). In that case the plaintiff cared for her aged father
for five years and told him that she intended to charge for her services, to
which he agreed. Disappointed at her inheritance, she sued his executor.
The court said, "The general rule is that, where one renders services of value
to another, with his knowledge and consent, the presumption is that the
one rendering services expects to be compensated, and that the one to
whom the services are rendered intends to pay for the same; and so the
law implies a promise to pay." Id. at 781, 176 N.W. at 809. (Emphasis
added.) In Ellis v. Cox, 176 N.C. 616, 97 S.E. 468 (1918), it was said, "The
jury or a referee may find as a fact an intent on the one part to charge and
on the other to pay for the services, and . . . the law implies a contract to
pay.... ." Id. at 619, 97 S.E. at 469.
" It not infrequently happens that those who are 'old and only in
the way' are bundled off upon some more amiable member of the family,
who uncomplainingly responds without the slightest assistance from the
complacently selfish: and in the contest which ensues, really an effort
to compel contribution based upon the same moral obligation, the selfish
appear consumed with a 'righteous indignation' at the hardness of the
claimant, which has as little sincerity as Judas exhibited in his protest
against the waste of the precious ointment: 'This he said, not that he cared
for the poor, but because he ... had the bag, and bare what was put therein.'
John xii, 6." Jones v. Jones, 129 S.C. 8, 12-13, 123 S.E. 763, 764 (1924).
It is not surprising that the South Carolina Supreme Court ruled that there
was a presumption that the plaintiff's services were rendered for a charge.
" Synder v. Nixon, 188 Iowa 779, 176 N.W. 808 (1920) (no relation);
Nesbitt v. Donoho, 198 N.C. 147, 150 S.E. 875 (1929) (father); Henderson
v. McLain, 146 N.C. 329, 59 S.E. 873 (1907) (mother-in-law); Whitaker
v. Whitaker, 138 N.C. 205, 50 S.E. 630 (1905) (grandfather); Jones v.
Jones, 129 S.C. 8, 123 S.E. 763 (1924) (father-in-law).
" Disbrow v. Durand, 54 N.J.L. 343, 24 Atl. 545 (Ct. Err. & App. 1892)
(brother); Frain v. Brady, 48 R.I. 24, 134 Atl. 645 (1926) (no relation).
"'Winkler v. Killian, 141 N.C. 575, 54 S.E. 540 (1906) (semble)
(mother); Conkling's Estate v. Champlin, 193 Okla. 79, 141 P.2d 569
(1943) (no relation).
5 In In re Marine Trust Co., 156 Misc. 297, 281 N.Y. Supp. 553 (Sup.
Ct. 1935), recovery was facilitated by N.Y. PERSONAL PROPERTY LAW § 83
which provides essentially that one furnishing necessaries to an incompetent
can recover their value from his estate. It was held in Key v. Harris, 116
Tenn. 161, 92 S.W. 235 (1905), that recovery might be had on the theory of
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Other similar cases occur when the plaintiff, believing the de-
cedent to be destitute, renders professional services. The courts
have been more forthright in their application or refusal of quasi-
contract in this area.16
The authorities seem to be in conflict in cases where the plaintiff
provides services in the belief that she is legally married to the
decedent. She has rendered her household services because of this
belief, but finds on the husband's death that the marriage was never
legal. Where the parties relied on their marriage in good faith the
courts have generally refused to allow recovery.'1 On the other hand,
one jurisdiction has recognized the mistake as a basis for quasi-
contractual recovery and granted the appropriate relief in this situa-
tion.1
8
Further analysis shows that in most of the personal service
and marriage cases the plaintiff stood or failed on the basis of his
state of mind at the time he conferred benefits on the decedent. If
the plaintiff intended a gratuity he was thereby barred from re-
covery, but if it could be presumed that he intended to charge he
could do so later. Two cases in North Carolina seem to run con-
trary to this general rule.
In -Prince v. McRae9 the plaintiff, a physician, had rendered
services to the decedent. The plaintiff had not made a charge but
later apparently decided to collect from the decedent's estate. The
North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed his recovery, and upheld
the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury that an initial gratuitous
furnishing necessaries to an incompetent, where the plaintiff had nursed her
idiot sister over a period of years. This theory was suggested by the court
in spite of the fact that Tennessee had no counterpart of N.Y. PERSONAL
PROPERTY LAW § 83.
A' Recovery was allowed in quasi-contract where the estate of the one
benefited was valued at upwards of $400,000. The court intimated that
there might have been non-disclosure by the decedent. It re Agnew's Will,
132 Misc. 466, 230 N.Y. Supp. 519 (Surr. Ct. 1928). When the estate of
the one benefited amount to only about $1,800, however, the court denied any
recovery. ln re Thomas' Estate, 132 Misc. 842, 231 N.Y. Supp. 93 (Surr.
Ct. 1928).
" Nicely v. Howard, 195 Ky. 327, 242 S.W. 602 (1922) (dictum);
Ogden v. McHugh, 167 Mass. 267, 45 N.E. 731 (1897) (dictum); Cooper v.
Cooper, 147 Mass. 370, 17 N.E. 892 (1888); Cropsey v. Sweeney, 27 Barb.
310 (N.Y. 1857).
" Roberts v. Roberts, 64 Wyo. 433, 196 P.2d 361 (1948). In Sanders
v. Ragan, 172 N.C. 612, 90 S.E. 777 (1916), the decedent had fraudulently
induced the plaintiff to render her household services, and recovery was
allowed on that basis.
" 84 N.C. 674 (1881).
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intent on his part would defeat the plaintiff. Indeed, the court seems
to have overlooked altogether the question of the plaintiff's original
state of mind.
In Thomas v. Thomasville Shooting Club2" the North Carolina
Supreme Court upheld an instruction that:
If Thomas did not at the time intend to charge for getting up the
leases, and this was known to the defendant, then lie could not
charge and recover for same, but if it was not known to the
defendant that Thomas did not intend to charge, then Thomas
could afterwards sue for and recover for his services in getting
up the leases.2 '
This appears to be a unique rule, enabling the plaintiff to change
his mind in order to recover for a benefit he originally intended as a
gift.
Where one bestows benefits gratuitously with full appreciation
of the facts it should not be the policy of the law to allow him to be
reimbursed,2 as was done in Thomas. But when one has a gra-
tuitous intent because of a misapprehension of attendant circum-
stances, the principal case should govern and that intent alone should
not bar his recovery.
The result of the Deskovick case appeals to the layman's rough
sense of justice. Should such a case arise in North Carolina,2 it
should be recognized as grounded on quasi-contract, and the donor's
original benevolent motives should not defeat him in court, so long
as he was misled in the formulation of those motives.
SCOTT N. BROWN, JR.
Workmen's Compensation-Scope of Immunity from Actions at
Law-The Question of Borrowed Servants
A landowner, constructing a storage plant for use in its business,
employed a crew to lay water and sewer pipe on the construction site.
" 121 N.C. 238, 28 S.E. 293 (1897).
2_ Id. at 240, 28 S.E. at 294.
2 See Meier v. Planer, 107 N.J. Eq. 398, 152 AUt. 246 (Ch. 1930);
Everitt v. Walker, 109 N.C. 129, 13 S.E. 860 (1891); Trustees of the
University v. McNair's Executors, 37 N.C. 605 (1843).
" See Basinger v. Pharr, 225 N.C. 531, 35 S.E.2d 626 (1945). In that
case the plaintiff had brought an action to recover money advanced by him on
behalf of his father for medical expenses, etc., incurred by the latter during
his last illness. In the same action the plaintiff sought recovery of an ad-
vance made directly to the decedent. The lower court non-suited the plain-
tiff as to both items, and he appealed only as to the second, leaving open the
precise question presented by Deskovick.
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Digging the ditches for this pipe was a nineteen-ton "backhoe"
rented by the landowner under a written contract whereby the
machine was furnished with an operator and fuel at a specified
hourly cost. A member of the pipe-laying crew suffered fatal in-
juries when he was partially crushed under the crawler tracks of the
"backhoe." Plaintiff, administratrix of the employee's estate, in-
stituted a wrongful death action against the operator of the machine
on the basis of his alleged negligence and the owner of the machine
under respondeat superior. Defendants, alleging plaintiff's sole
remedy to be found under the Workmen's Compensation Act,
claimed immunity from action at law.' judgment of involuntary
nonsuit was reversed in Weaver v. Bennett.2 The North Carolina
Supreme Court held that plaintiff's evidence did not affirmatively
show that the operator was conducting the business of intestate's
employer within the meaning of General Statutes section 97-9 and
therefore immune from suit.'
The variety of employment practices in the construction industry
presents with increasing regularity4 the question of the principal
case: does coverage under Workmen's Compensation preclude an
action at law by an injured employee against the person whose
negligence caused the injury? A conflict results between the fault
concept of tort liability and the theory of enterprise liability," which
is the basis of Workmen's Compensation." The conflict arises be-
' "Every employer . . .or those conducting his business shall only be
liable to any employee who elects to come under this article for personal
injury or death by accident to the extent and in the manner herein specified."
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-9 (1958). (Emphasis added.)
2259 N.C. 16, 129 S.E.2d 610 (1963).
3Id. at 30, 129 S.E.2d at 620.
"Smith v. John B. Kelley, Inc., 275 F.2d 169, 172 (D.C. Cir. 1960)
(concurring opinion); Larson, "Model-T" Compensation Acts in the
Atomic Age, 18 NACCA L.J. 39, 44 (1956).
'See HARPER & JAMES, TORTS §§ 12.1-13.7 (1956).
6 "The philosophy which supports the Workmen's Compensation Act
is 'that the wear and tear of human beings in modern industry should be
charged to the industry, just as the wear and tear of machinery has always
been charged. And while such compensation is presumably charged to the
industry, and consequently to the employer or owner of the industry, eventu-
ally it becomes a part of the fair money cost of the industrial product, to be
paid for by the general public patronizing such products.'" Vause v. Vause
Farm Equipment Co., 233 N.C. 88, 92; 63 S.E.2d 173, 176 (1951). But see
Whitte, The Theory of Workmen's Compensation, 20 AM. LAB. LEG. REv.
411 (1930) indicating that it is the employer and not the consumer who
bears the burden of compensation. For discussion of the theory of non-
employers' liability in actions at law, see McCoid, The Third Person in the
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cause of statutory provisions limiting actions at law against those
responsible for injuries covered by Workmen's Compensation. 7 In
the majority of jurisdictions employers are immune from actions
at law.' But fellow employees,9 principal contractors, 10 subcontrac-
tors,"' independent contractors,'" and their employees' s may be
amenable to suit, depending on the provisions of the statutes in-
volved. 4
Compensation Picture: A Study of the Liabilities and Rights of Non-
Employers, 37 TEXAS L. REv. 389, 395-403 (1959).
" See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.39 (Supp. 1962) (recognizing a right
of action against a "third party"); MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 152, § 15 (1957)
(recognizing a right of action against a "person other than the insured");
see generally 2 LARSON, LAw OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION §§ 72.00-.70
(1952); 3 SCHNEIDER, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION TEXT § 842 (perm. ed.
1943).
'1 SCHNEIDER, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION TEXT § 90 (perm. ed. 1941);
see, e.g., McNair v. Ward, 240 N.C. 330, 82 S.E.2d 85 (1954).
9 For cases granting immunity, see, e.g., Rylander v. Chicago Short
Line Ry., 17 Ill. 2d 618, 161 N.E.2d 812 (1959); Bresnahan v. Barre, 286
Mass. 593, 190 N.E. 815 (1934); Feitig v. Chalkley, 185 Va. 96, 38 S.E.2d
106 (1946). For cases allowing action at law, see, e.g., Kimbo v. Holladay,
154 So. 369 (La. App. 1934) ; Gee v. Horvath, 169 Ohio St. 14, 157 N.E.2d
354 (1959) ; Zimmer v. Casey, 296 Pa. 529, 146 AtI. 130 (1929).
"0 For cases granting immunity, generally the result where the contractor
is directly responsible for the payment of compensation benefits, see, e.g.,
Adams v. Hercules Powder Co., 180 Tenn. 340, 175 S.W.2d 319 (1943);
Sykes v. Stone & Webster Eng'r Corp., 186 Va. 116, 41 S.E.2d 469 (1947).
For cases allowing action at law, generally the result in -the absence of a
direct statutory liability for compensation benefits, see, e.g., Clark v.
Monarch Eng'r Co., 248 N.Y. 107, 161 N.E. 436 (1928) ; Cathey v. South-
eastern Constr. Co., 218 N.C. 525, 11 S.E.2d 571 (1940). N.C. GN. STAT.
§ 97-19 (1958) extends qualified statutory liability for compensation benefits
only to principal contractors, intermediate contractors, and subcontractors.
For discussion suggesting inclusion of owners and principal employers, see
35 N.C.L. REv. 569 (1957).
"For cases granting immunity, see, e.g., Miami Roofing & Sheet Metal
Co. v. Kindt, 48 So.2d 840 (Fla. 1950); Rea v. Ford, 198 Va. 712, 96
S.E.2d 92 (1957). For cases allowing action at law, see, e.g., Davison v.
Martin K. Eby Constr. Co., 169 Kan. 256, 218 P.2d 219 (1950); Dillman v.
John Diebold & Sons Stone Co., 241 Kjr. 631, 44 S.W.2d 581 (1931); Olsen
v. Sharpe, 191 Tenn. 503, 235 S.W.2d 11 (1950).
"'For cases granting immunity, see, e.g., Doane v. E. I. DuPont de
Nemours & Co., 209 F.2d 921 (4th Cir. 1954); Williams v. E. T. Gresham
Co., 201 Va. 457, 111 S.E.2d 498 (1959). For cases allowing action at law,
see, e.g., Haw v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 180 F.2d 18 (D.C. Cir. 1950);
Kramer v. Kramer, 199 Va. 409, 100 S.E.2d 37 (1957).
"'For cases granting immunity, see, e.g., Doane v. E. L DuPont de
Nemours & Co., supra note 12; Miami Roofing & Sheet Metal Co. v. Kindt,
48 So.2d 840 (Fla. 1950); Williams v. E. T. Gresham Co., supra note 12.
For cases allowing action at law, see, e.g., Haw v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.,
supra note 12; Olsen v. Sharpe, 191 Tenn. 503, 235 S.W.2d 11 (1950);
Kramer v. Kramer, supra note 12.
" See 2 LARSON, op. cit. supra note 7, §§ 72.00-.70; 3 SCHNEIDER, op. cit.
supra note 7, § 842.
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Section 97-9 of the General Statutes confers immunity on the
employer and "those conducting his business" 5 When first inter-
preting that phrase, the North Carolina Supreme Court included
fellow employees within its meaning 8 and called for its liberal con-
struction."' Early interpretations arose in actions by or on behalf
of employees where the defendants unsuccessfully sought to join the
employees' employers, superiors," and fellow employees.1"  Later
the court held that an employee could not maintain an action at law
against a fellow employee responsible for his compensable injury.20
Immunity for fellow employees and superiors receives support as a
furtherance of the purpose of Workmen's Compensation, because
without it the cost of injury shifts from the enterprise to its indi-
vidual workers."In the principal case, the court concluded that the operator of
the "backhoe" was not conducting the landowner's business because
he had not become the landowner's borrowed servant.22 Thus, ap-
plication of the borrowed servant doctrine" apparently limits the
scope of the phrase, ""those conducting his business," to employees,
yet it is an imprecise phase adaptable to broader interpretation. The
""Every employer . . or those conducting his business shall only be
liable to any employee who elects to come under this article for personal
injury or death by accident to the extent and in the manner herein specified."
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-9 (1958). (Emphasis added.)
Essick v. Lexington, 232 N.C. 200, 60 S.E.2d 106 (1950).
'
7
"We have no space to call attention to the contradictions and fantastic
situations that must arise under the application of G.S. 97-10 unless 97-9 is
given its weight in an in pari inateria interpretation of both sections, and
the immunity given in Section 97-9 to 'those conducting the [sic] business'
be given a liberal construction and its definitions and intendments carried
through the provisions of 97-10." Id. at 210, 60 S.E.2d at 113. N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 97-10.1, 97-10.2, as amended, N.C. SEss. LAws 1963, ch. 450, § 1,
97-10.3 (Supp. 1961), replaces N.C. Snss. LAws 1929, ch. 120, § 11, as
amended, N.C. SEss. LAws 1933, ch. 449, § 1, as amended, N.C. SESs. LAWS
1943, ch. 662, repealed by N.C. SEss. LAws 1959, ch. 1324. For discussion
of the change, see Comments on North Carolina 1959 Session Laws, 38
N.C.L. REv. 154, 242 (1960).
" Essick v. Lexington, 232 N.C. 200, 60 S.E.2d 106 (1950).
"Bass v. Ingold, 232 N.C. 295, 60 S.E.2d 114 (1950).
" Warner v. Leder, 234 N.C. 727, 69 S.E.2d 6 (1952), 30 N.C.L. Rnv.
474.
"See 43 IoWA L. Rv. 352 (1958); 30 N.C.L. REv. 474 (1952); 39
VA. L. REv. 951 (1953); 17 WASH. & LEE L. IRv. 315 (1960); But see 1
WILL. & MARY L. REv. 123 (1957).
"Weaver v. Bennett, 259 N.C. 16, 30, 129 S.E.2d 610, 620 (1963).
" "A person, natural or corporate, may lend or let a servant to another
in such a way as to be relieved from liability arising out of injury to another
through the negligence of the servant." Leonard v. Tatum & Dalton Transfer
Co., 218 N.C. 667, 671, 12 S.E.2d 729, 731 (1940) (dictum).
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borrowed servant doctrine, itself imprecise and chaotic,24 has been.
applied by the courts to determine liability under respondeat superior
through various tests, generally falling into three classifications. 5
The first is the "control" test, which may mean either "broad" 28 or
"spot" 27 control. Second is the "whose business" test,28 and finally
is that test which is a combination of the two.2 9
North Carolina decisions relieving lending masters of liability
under respondeat superior are based on the supervision, control, and
direction exercised by the borrowing masters in situations where the
lending masters relinguished authority to direct the servants' manner
or method of performance. 30  Thus, having the power of immediate
direction and control brings liability to a borrowing master."1 But
2 "The law that defines or seeks to define the distinction between gen-
eral and special employers is beset with distinctions so delicate that chaos is
the consequence. No lawyer can say with assurance in any given situation
where one employment ends and the other begins. The wrong choice of
defendants is often made, with instances, all too many, in which justice has
miscarried." Cardozo, A Ministry of Justice, 35 HARv. L. REv. 113, 121
(1921). See Annot., 17 A.L.R.2d 1388 (1951).
2 See Haw v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 180 F.2d 18 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (dic-
tum); Nepstad v. Lambert, 235 Minn. 1, 50 N.W.2d 614 (1951) (dictum);
Smith, Scope of the Business: The Borrowed Servant Problem, 38 MIcH.
L. REv. 1222, 1230-34 (1940).
28 See, e.g., Haw v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., supra note 25; Hodge v.
McGuire, 235 N.C. 132, 69 S.E.2d 227 (1952). This test relies on "control
in the broad sense of hiring, training, and firing." Smith, supra note 25, at
1230.
. See, e.g., Nepstad v. Lambert, 235 Minn. 1, 50 N.W.2d 614 (1951);
Wadford v. Gregory Chandler Co., 213 N.C. 802, 196 S.E. 815 (1938). This
test relies on "control exercised by the man on the spot, the man who says
when and where to go and how fast." Smith, supra note 25, at 1230. "The
control test . . . in principle is medieval, inextricably mixed with the now-
discredited 'command' rationale of vicarious liability. In application it is
uncertain and ambiguous." Smith, supra note 25, at 1233.
28 See, e.g., Devaney v. Lawler Corp., 101 Mont. 579, 56 P.2d 746
(1936); Jones v. Henderson Tobacco Co., 231 N.C. 336, 56 S.E.2d 598
(1949). This test relies on "Whose business is being done by the borrowed
servant ?" Smith, supra note 25, at 1233. "The only trouble with the whose
business test is that, in difficulty of application, it is as bad as the control
test. The results are unpredictable, uncertain, and in many cases probably
unjust." Smith, supra note 25, at 1234.
" See, e.g., Denton v. Yazoo & Mississippi Valley R.R., 284 U.S. 305
(1932); Standard Oil Co. v. Anderson, 212 U.S. 215 (1905). "To deter-
mine whether a given case falls within the one class or the other we must
inquire whose is the work being performed, a question which is usually
answered by ascertaining who has the power to control and direct the
servants in the performance of their work." Id. at 221.
so Wadford v. Gregory Chandler Co., 213 N.C. 802, 196 S.E. 815 (1938);
Shapiro v. Winston-Salem, 212 N.C. 751, 194 S.E. 479 (1938).8 Jackson v. Joyner, 236 N.C. 259, 72 S.E.2d 589 (1952).
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a lending master who retains the right to control is held liable for
the servant's torts.32 On one occasion the court applied the "whose
business" test in holding that a servant was not loaned to the party
sought to be held,3" but "control" generally determines liability
under respondeat superior in North Carolina.8 4
Therefore, in the principal case the court correctly spoke of
control as decisive had the issue been solely whether or not the
lessor of the "backhoe" was liable for the operator's negligence.
The issue under the Workmen's Compensation Act immunity pro-
vision, however, is whether or not the operator was conducting the
lessee's business. Thus, regardless of the North Carolina criteria
for determining borrowed servants, the language of section 97-93"
suggests application of a test analogous to the "whose business"
test.
Virginia, like North Carolina, has a provision in its Workmen's
Compensation Act granting immunity to the employer and "those
conducting his business."' Construction of the phrase began there
"
2Hodge v. McGuire, 235 N.C. 132, 69 S.E.2d 227 (1952); accord,
Leonard v. Tatum & Dalton Transfer Co., 218 N.C. 667, 12 S.E.2d 729
(1940) where defendant retained the right to control because he had not "so
completely surrendered as to virtually suspend, temporarily, at least, any
responsibility which might reasonably be associated with control." Id. at
671, 12 S.E.2d at 731. "To us, when the principle is tested by the elements
stated above [complete surrender of control by the master, renunciation of all
obedience to the master by the servant], the result is the destruction of the
principle. When a master turns an employee to another's service under the
tests outlined, it is not a loan of the servant, it is a complete giving up of
the servant, a termination of any relationship between the hiring master
and the servant. It would be an out and out change of employment. It
would be a discharge from one master and a hiring by another." Wylie-
Stewart Mach. Co. v. Thomas, 192 Okla. 505, 507, 137 P.2d 556, 558 (1943)
(dictum).
38 See Jones v. Henderson Tobacco Co., 231 N.C. 336, 56 S.E.2d 598
(1949) ; see also Liverman v. Cline, 212 N.C. 43, 192 S.E. 849 (1937).
"The control test has also been applied to distinguish independent con-
tractors from servants. Harris v. White Constr. Co., 240 N.C. 556, 82
S.E.2d 689 (1954); Hinlde v. Lexington, 239 N.C. 105, 79 S.E.2d 220
(1953); Hayes v. Elon College, 224 N.C. 11, 29 S.E.2d 137 (1944); Lassiter
v. Cline, 222 N.C. 271, 22 S.E.2d 558 (1942). Compare Liverman v. Cline,
supra note 33.
""Every employer . . . or those conducting his business shall only be
liable to any employee who elects to come under this article for personal
injury or death by accident to the extent and in the manner herein specified."
N.C. GEN. S AT. § 97-9 (1958). (Emphasis added.)
"d "While such insurance remains in force he [the employer] or those
conducting his business shall be liable to an employee for personal injury
or death by accident to the extent and in the manner herein specified." VA.
CODE ANN. § 65-99 (1949). (Emphasis added.)
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as in North Carolina when its meaning was held to encompass fellow
employees. In a later application of Virginia law, the Circuit
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reached a result
similar to that of the principal case when it held that an employee
of a landowner could maintain an action at law against the operator
of a bulldozer leased by the landowner, notwithstanding coverage
by Workmen's Compensation." The Virginia court refused to
follow that decision when faced with this problem. The principal
contractor on a school project leased a crane and operator at a
specified hourly rate. An employee of the principal contractor was
injured and brought action against the operator and the owner of
the crane. Basing its decision on prior interpretations of the Vir-
ginia act's immunity provision, 9 the court upheld immunity as a
complete defense." Expressly excluded from consideration was the
borrowed servant doctrine."'
In a later Virginia case,42 the court again granted immunity
to the lessor of a crane without considering whether the operator
had become the borrowed servant of the lessee. Action at law was
not allowed because the defendant was engaged in work which was
part of the trade, business, or occupation of the lessee, plaintiff's
employer, and was therefore conducting his business.3  This test
"' Fetig v. Chalkley, 185 Va. 96, 38 S.E.2d 73 (1946).
:'Hav v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 180 F.2d 18 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
9 Immunity was granted in Doane v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co.,
209 F.2d 921 (4th Cir. 1954) (independent contractor); Sykes v. Stone &
Webster Eng'r Corp., 186 Va. 116, 41 S.E.2d 469 (1947) (general con-
tractor); Feitig v. Chalkley, 185 Va. 96, 38 S.E.2d 73 (1946) (fellow
employee). . "The purpose of the Virginia statute as interpreted by its
highest court is to limit the recovery of all persons engaged in the business
under consideration to compensation under the act, and to deny an injured
person the right of recovery against any other person unless he be a stranger
to the business." Doane v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., supra at 926
(dictum). (Emphasis added.)Rea v. Ford, 198 Va. 712, 96 S.E.2d 92 (1957), 43 VA. L. Rxv. 619.
' "The view we have taken of the matter makes it unnecessary to con-
sider whether in the present case at the time of the accident the crane
operator was the loaned employee of the principal contractor, Daniel, and
the fellow servant of Rea, and if so, what effect that had upon the right
of the plaintiff administratrix to maintain the present action at law." Id. at
718, 96 S.E.2d at 96.
,Williams v. E. T. Gresham Co., 201 Va. 457, 111 S.E.2d 498 (1959).
"The application of the "trade, business, or occupation" test does not
always result in immunity. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Wallace, 172 F.2d
802 (4th Cir. 1949). Compare Anderson v. Thorington Constr. Co., 201
Va. 266, 110 S.E.2d 396 (1959), appeal dismissed, 363 U.S. 719 (1960),
with Kramer v. Kramer, 199 Va. 409, 100 S.E.2d 37 (1957). See generally
King v. Palmer, 129 Conn. 636, 30 A.2d 549 (1943).
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conf orms to -the statutory language. Moreover, it places the cost
of'irijury on the single enterprise in which the parties were engaged.If, the industry in which an injury arises is to bear the burden
of that injury, it is insignificant that a machine necessary to that
industry is not operated by an employee or a borrowed servant.,
When the question for determination is whether a machine operator
is- conducting the business of the machine's lessee, an inquiry as to
the right to control the operator answers little.4"  Perhaps the de-
cision of the principal case reflects doubt over the adequacy of Work-
men's Compensation benefits. If so, it joins leading writers who call
for a complete re-evaluation of Workmen's Compensation Acts.40
Discussion of the manifold problems of the acts is beyond the scope
of this note. Nevertheless, it is submitted that the legislature should
examine the immunity question in light of present employment
practices and effect changes manifesting its intent in definitive
language.
ARcHi T. ALLEN, III
"See notes 35 & 36 supra.
""The earlier cases tested this relationship [employer-employee] through'
application of the 'control' factor, originally a test for tortious liability,
having its roots in the relationship of the apprentice to his master in early
English industrial society.' As applied to today's complex economy of the
assembly line, of dispersed industrial operations, of concentrated operations
but with gemi-autonomous 'departments' or branches, and of general con-
tractors who, in turn, employ subcontractors and sub-subcontractors, the
'control' test is often meaningless, usually ambiguous, and always susceptible
of paperwriting evasions. Consequently we have abandoned it." Schulte
v. American Box Board Co., 358 Mich. 21, 32, 99 N.W.2d 367, 372 (1959)
(concurring opinion) ,
" See Brodie, The Adequacy of Workmen's Compensation As Social
Insurance: A Review of Developments and Proposals, 1963 Wxs. L. REv.
57;. Larson, "Model-T" Compensation Acts in the Atomic Age, 18 NACCA
L.J. 39 (1956); Riesenfeld, Efficacy and Costs of Workmen's Compensation,
49 CALIF. L. REv. 631 (1961). For suggestion of the abolition of employers'
immunity, see Marcus, Advocating the Rights of the Injured, 61 MxcH. L.
R3zv. 921 (1963).
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